CBRN - Vulnerability Assessment and Protection of People at Risk

This Technical Specification is based on an all-hazards approach, with a specific focus on terrorism and other security related risks. Looking at the combination of threats, vulnerabilities and values to be protected, threats may be terrorist attacks with chemical, explosive and biological agents, or nuclear waste materials, or with conventional means on CBRN plants, causing a similar devastating effect on a potentially large scale. Major CBRN incidents may jeopardise critical infrastructure, while emergency services may have great difficulty performing their response tasks. The scope excludes the vulnerability assessment of some specific systems that comply, at the European and Member State level, with existing sets of legal measures: network for drinking water distribution, food chain supply and cosmetics and pharmaceutical products production and distribution chains. The objective of this Technical Specification is to strengthen common understanding and a common frame of reference for all organisations with an interest and involvement in CBRN. It does so by providing a number of considerations and tools that can be used in the development of a semi-quantitative conceptual framework for vulnerability assessment, awareness and management. The vulnerability assessment covers all members of the population at risk including the requirements of children, the elderly and those with disabilities.

ABC-Risiken - Verwundbarkeitsbewertung und Schutz gefährdeter Bevölkerungsteile

Diese Technische Spezifikation beruht auf einem für alle Gefährdungen gültigen Ansatz, der einen spezifischen Schwerpunkt auf Terrorismus und andere Sicherheitsrisiken legt. Beim Blick auf den Zusammen-hang von Bedrohungen, Verwundbarkeiten und zu schützenden Werten können die Bedrohungen in terroristischen Angriffen mit chemischen, explosiven und biologischen Wirkstoffen oder atomaren Abfallstoffen bestehen oder in konventionellen Angriffen auf CBRN-Betriebsanlagen, die ähnlich zerstörerische Aus¬wirkungen in potenziell großem Ausmaß bewirken. Große CBRN Zwischenfälle können die kritische Infra¬struktur gefährden, während Notfalldienste große Schwierigkeiten beim Ausüben ihrer Tätigkeiten haben können.
Der Anwendungsbereich schließt die Verwundbarkeitsbewertung einiger spezifischer Systeme aus, die bereits vorhandenen Rechtsvorschriften auf europäischer oder der Ebene der Mitgliedsstaaten entsprechen: Systeme zur Verteilung des Trinkwassers, Lebensmittelversorgungsketten, Herstellung pharmazeutischer und kosme-tischer Produkte und Vertriebswege.
Dieses Dokument soll das allgemeine Verständnis fördern und einen allgemeinen Bezugs¬rahmen für sämtliche Organisationen bereitstellen, die in eine CBRN Thematik eingebunden oder an dieser interessiert sind. Das geschieht durch die Bereitstellung einer Reihe von Hinweisen und einer Anzahl von Instrumenten, die bei der Entwicklung eines semi-quantitativen, konzeptuellen Bezugsrahmens zur Beurteilung, Bewusst¬seinsbildung und Handhabung von Verwundbarkeit verwendet werden können. Die Verwundbarkeits¬bewertung umfasst sämtliche Mitglieder einer Risikogruppe und schließt Anforderungen für Kinder, Senioren und Menschen mit besonderen Bedürfnissen ein.

NRBC - Evaluation de la vulnérabilité et protection des populations à risque

CBRN (kemična, biološka, radiološka in jedrska tveganja) - Ocenjevanje ranljivosti in zaščita ogroženih ljudi

General Information

Status
Published
Publication Date
10-Feb-2014
Technical Committee
Current Stage
6060 - National Implementation/Publication (Adopted Project)
Start Date
02-Jan-2014
Due Date
09-Mar-2014
Completion Date
11-Feb-2014

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SLOVENSKI STANDARD
SIST-TS CEN/TS 16595:2014
01-marec-2014

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CBRN - Vulnerability Assessment and Protection of People at Risk
ABC-Risiken - Verwundbarkeitsbewertung und Schutz gefährdeter Bevölkerungsteile
NRBC - Evaluation de la vulnérabilité et protection des populations à risque
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: CEN/TS 16595:2013
ICS:
13.200 3UHSUHþHYDQMHQHVUHþLQ Accident and disaster control
NDWDVWURI
SIST-TS CEN/TS 16595:2014 en,fr,de

2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.

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SIST-TS CEN/TS 16595:2014
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SIST-TS CEN/TS 16595:2014
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
CEN/TS 16595
SPÉCIFICATION TECHNIQUE
TECHNISCHE SPEZIFIKATION
September 2013
ICS 13.200
English Version
CBRN - Vulnerability Assessment and Protection of People at
Risk

NRBC - Evaluation de la vulnérabilité et protection des ABC-Risiken - Verwundbarkeitsbewertung und Schutz

populations à risque gefährdeter Bevölkerungsteile

This Technical Specification (CEN/TS) was approved by CEN on 19 August 2013 for provisional application.

The period of validity of this CEN/TS is limited initially to three years. After two years the members of CEN will be requested to submit their

comments, particularly on the question whether the CEN/TS can be converted into a European Standard.

CEN members are required to announce the existence of this CEN/TS in the same way as for an EN and to make the CEN/TS available

promptly at national level in an appropriate form. It is permissible to keep conflicting national standards in force (in parallel to the CEN/TS)

until the final decision about the possible conversion of the CEN/TS into an EN is reached.

CEN members are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,

Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,

Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United

Kingdom.
EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION
COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DE NORMALISATION
EUROPÄISCHES KOMITEE FÜR NORMUNG
CEN-CENELEC Management Centre: Avenue Marnix 17, B-1000 Brussels

© 2013 CEN All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved Ref. No. CEN/TS 16595:2013: E

worldwide for CEN national Members.
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Contents Page

Foreword ..............................................................................................................................................................3

Introduction .........................................................................................................................................................4

1 Scope ......................................................................................................................................................5

2 Normative references ............................................................................................................................5

3 Terms and definitions ...........................................................................................................................5

4 Abbreviated terms .................................................................................................................................5

5 Vulnerability assessment ......................................................................................................................6

5.1 Different approaches to vulnerability in social and natural science ................................................6

5.2 Vulnerability assessment ......................................................................................................................7

6 Protection of the population at risk .................................................................................................. 10

6.1 Vulnerability awareness ..................................................................................................................... 10

6.2 Vulnerability management ................................................................................................................. 12

6.2.1 General approaches ........................................................................................................................... 12

6.2.2 Use of surveys .................................................................................................................................... 17

6.2.3 Use of templates ................................................................................................................................. 19

Annex A (informative) Template for a general management system for CBRN vulnerability

assessment, awareness and management ...................................................................................... 21

Annex B (informative) Historical timeline for the development of conceptual models in

vulnerability ......................................................................................................................................... 29

Bibliography ..................................................................................................................................................... 33

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Foreword

This document (CEN/TS 16595:2013) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 391 “Societal and

Citizen Security”, the secretariat of which is held by NEN.

This Technical Specification (TS) on CBRN vulnerability assessment, awareness and management provides a

common frame of reference and recommends methodologies to assess the vulnerabilities of citizens, first

responders and other assets to an ‘all-hazard’, i.e. natural, incidental or intended, exposure to hazardous

substances.

These hazardous substances could be Chemical, Biological or Radiological (the latter forming the hazardous

part of Nuclear, together abbreviated to CBRN). CBRN agents can cause significant direct and indirect

damage to persons, livestock, vegetation and environment as well as disrupt the system of products and

services we need to sustain our daily livelihoods, i.e. our ‘Critical Infrastructure’.

This Technical Specification can be used as a starting point for further risk and vulnerability assessment and

for guidelines on the many issues surrounding a CBRN incident. It is intended for any organisation involved or

interested in CBRN, both in the private sector and for public authorities.

The elaboration of this European technical specification has been financially supported by the European

Commission and the CIPS programme (Grant agreement HOME /2009/CIPS/FP/CEN-003 VAPPAR).

Important notice:

Whereas the original request called for a ‘risk’-based approach, CEN/TC 391 ‘Societal and Citizen

Security’ recommended to change this to a ‘vulnerability’-based approach. Terms such as ‘risk’ and

‘vulnerability’- and their assessment, awareness and management – can be approached from both a

social sciences as well as a natural sciences approach. By combining the latest academic insights with

operational lessons, this document attempts to reconcile some of the differences between these

conflicting scientific approaches.
It cannot be emphasised enough that this Technical Specification:

 is intended to meet the complex and variable needs of a wide range of different end-users;

 is an initial document of which other versions can be developed in the future;
 offers a common frame of reference and a common context;

 can be viewed in the context of being a ‘standard’, a ‘scientific paper’ and an ‘open source’ document;

 puts a stronger emphasis on ‘recommendations’ then on ‘requirements'. These advantages include the

fact that recommendations facilitate customisation by the end-users themselves and allow for an

interactive, participatory format of tools such as models, tables and checklists;

 is not a European Standard. Technical Specifications such as the VAPPAR document can co-exist with

any national standard whereby specific (national) regulations take precedence over any Technical

Specification.

According to the CEN/CENELEC Internal Regulations, the national standards organisations of the following

countries are bound to announce this Technical Specification: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,

Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany,

Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,

Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

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Introduction

National regulations in most European countries focus on emergency responders (e.g. personal protective

equipment (PPE) and intervention procedures), and European and national regulations regulate contingency

planning of chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological plants and industries. The protection of the

population, animals, vegetation and environment from CBRN incidents is a field in need of a common

understanding of vulnerability assessment, awareness and management.
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1 Scope

This Technical Specification is based on an all-hazards approach, with a specific focus on terrorism and other

security related risks. Looking at the combination of threats, vulnerabilities and values to be protected, threats

may be terrorist attacks with chemical, explosive and biological agents, or nuclear waste materials, or with

conventional means on CBRN plants, causing a similar devastating effect on a potentially large scale. Major

CBRN incidents may jeopardise critical infrastructure, while emergency services may have great difficulty

performing their response tasks.

The scope excludes the vulnerability assessment of some specific systems that comply, at the European and

Member State level, with existing sets of legal measures: network for drinking water distribution, food chain

supply and cosmetics and pharmaceutical products production and distribution chains.

The objective of this Technical Specification is to strengthen common understanding and a common frame of

reference for all organisations with an interest and involvement in CBRN. It does so by providing a number of

considerations and tools that can be used in the development of a semi-quantitative conceptual framework for

vulnerability assessment, awareness and management. The vulnerability assessment covers all members of

the population at risk including the requirements of children, the elderly and those with disabilities.

2 Normative references
Not applicable.
3 Terms and definitions

There are various documents that contain terms and definitions related to CBRN. Unfortunately, not all

documents are consistent with each other and it is therefore difficult to find a document which contains

a) all terms, and
b) meets with universal acceptance.

In the context of this document, the following documents are recommended for use by the end user of this

Technical Specification:
 ISO 31000, Risk Management – Principles and Guidelines
 ISO/Guide 73, Risk Management – Vocabulary
 ISO 22300, Societal Security – Terminology

 ISO 22301, Societal Security – Business Continuity Management Systems – Requirements

 ISO 22313, Societal security – business Continuity management systems – Guidance

 CWA 16106, PPE for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Hazards

 ISO 22320, Societal Security – Emergency management – Requirements for Incident Response

The use of the CBRN Glossary of the European Commission is mandatory in Europe
(see http://cbrn.jrc.ec.europa.eu.)
4 Abbreviated terms
B Biological
C Chemical
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CB Chemical, Biological
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Energy
CERT Community Emergency Response Team
ED Emergency Department
MD Medical Doctor
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
POC Point Of Contact
R Radiological
RN Registered Nurse
SWOT Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
VAPPAR Vulnerability Assessment and Protection of People at Risk
5 Vulnerability assessment
5.1 Different approaches to vulnerability in social and natural science

It is very difficult to find universally accepted definitions of ‘Vulnerability' [1].

Vulnerability assessment is only one component of loss estimation and risk assessment. Risk involves

forecasting of loss (and/or gain) and is composed of several components – hazard, vulnerability, exposure,

and coping capacity. Risk and its components are not specific to any feature or field, but are instead

ubiquitous notions applicable to any situation or experience. It is the conceptualisation of these components

(how they are considered, defined, divided, measured, and recombined) that differs.

Which components are considered to contribute to risk and how they are evaluated varies between

disciplines. Investigations in the social sciences consider a more general view of risk for societies at large and

for individuals, while investigations in the natural sciences and engineering give detailed consideration to

structural damage to the built environment and to life-loss.

In natural science, emphasis is placed on characterisation of hazard and exposure, which is quantitatively

strong. Vulnerability is considered a static factor that modifies the amount of loss caused by threats. Coping

capacity receives little, if any, attention.

In social science, emphasis is placed on vulnerability and coping capacity, which are considered as dynamic

and complex properties of a (social) system. Due to the complexity, qualitative methods are favoured. Hazard

is viewed as a static state of the physical/cultural environment and receives minimal attention.

The complementary strengths of natural science and social science perspectives can improve the

understanding and analysis of vulnerability. This requires an adaptation of the comprehensive views on

vulnerability in the social sciences to the more quantitative approaches that are typical of the natural sciences.

One of the challenges is that certain qualities can be dimensioned in a probabilistic fashion and some cannot.

While hazard and risk can be expressed in probabilistic fashion, this is much more difficult with vulnerability.

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The often used formalisations of ‘risk’ and ‘vulnerability’ (such as Risk = Probability x Consequence,

Risk=Hazard x Vulnerability, Risk=Hazard x Vulnerability/Coping Capacity) are generalisations that provide

little conceptual understanding and cannot, in and by themselves, be used to consider losses with different

metrics.

Understanding of vulnerability and coping capacity also requires clear and consistent risk terminology, which

is often lacking between and within disciplines.

A further complicating factor is the requirement that both ‘intentional’ and ‘incidental’ causes for a CBRN

events are considered in this Technical Specification. This necessitates a CBRN-specific differentiation

between ‘security’ (= intentional) and ‘safety’ (= incidental).
5.2 Vulnerability assessment

The vulnerability assessment is the overall process of the identification, analysis and evaluation of

vulnerabilities which can be used as a methodology for measures and procedures for CBRN prevention,

detection, decontamination, collective protection for emergency staff, mass protection for the citizens and

mitigation.

A methodological, STEP-BY-STEP approach is needed because even though a vulnerability assessment is

part of comprehensive emergency management, i.e. combining risk, response and consequence-

management approaches, the vulnerability assessment in and by itself is also a complex, systematic process.

Amongst others, it brings together elements such as:

Exposure and Coping Capacity When assessing vulnerability, ‘exposure’ can be considered as the “external”

side of vulnerability and ‘coping capacity’ as the “internal” side of vulnerability.

Environment: local (physical) or context (culture/history)
Consequences: Physical, Economic, Environmental, Administrative, Health

STEP 1: A vulnerability assessment starts by determining the strategic focus of the assessment, such as:

 Geographical scale;
 Time frame (e.g. direct losses or long term losses);

 Which type of consequences to be evaluated (life/health, economic, environmental).

STEP 2: A vulnerability assessment then seeks answers to questions such as:
 Should vulnerability include exposure? Coping capacity? Resilience?
 What is the unambiguous definition of vulnerability?
 Vulnerability of what (elements)? Vulnerability to what (threats)?

STEP 3: A systemic vulnerability assessment model needs to be developed in order to conceptualise and

clarify the relation(s) within and between elements.

The model below can be used as a reference point for vulnerability conceptualisation within risk assessment

context [1].
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Figure 1 - Vulnerability conceptualisation within risk assessment context [1]

STEP 4: The selected factors of vulnerability need to be quantified by use of indicators and criteria. Criteria

are often defined as: ‘conditions that need to be met’ and Indicators as: ‘measurable states which allow the

assessment of whether or not criteria are being met’. Their weighting shall be taken in local context.

Consequently, weighting of vulnerability through indicators and criteria is expected to vary with context but will

yield some quantitative estimation of overall vulnerability.

The components of the conceptual model below can be used as a reference point for the quantification of

vulnerability [1].
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Figure 2 - Quantification of vulnerability [1]
Suggestions for CBRN Vulnerability indicators

This list presents suggestions for CBRN vulnerability indicators. The list is not intended to be complete but

serves as a mere start to find most appropriate indicators for the specific situation. The measurement of

performance against these indicators may involve fundamentally different scales. An indication is given of the

likely scaling involved and compliance with published criteria.
 Awareness (citizens, responders, management);
 Responsiveness and effectiveness intelligence;
 Social control (neighbourhood watch (who, where, what);
 Willingness to act (citizens, guards, police);
 Possibility of chain effects in storage/transport of CBRN agents;
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 Accessibility of indoor public area’s for CBRN agents;

 Accessibility of air inlet or direct vicinity of indoor public area’s for CB vapour/aerosol;

 Accessibility of primary life lines (water, electricity generation and distribution, electronic communication,

food distribution centres);
 Preparedness (training / equipment) (citizens, responders, management);
 Quality of warning systems (C/B/R different detection);
 Total response time;
 Information systems: quality and resilience/back up;
 Prepositioning of resources;
 Response of civilians / community emergency response teams (CERT);
 Amount of citizens within danger range of CBRN industry/storage/transport;
 Ventilation capacity of homes/public area’s after alarm;
 Amount/capacity of responders;
 Amount/capacity of medical aid;
 Redundancy of mass transport possibilities;

 Possibility of chain effects of CBRN agent on critical infrastructure, i.e. ‘cascading’ effects or ‘systemic’

risk (see below).
6 Protection of the population at risk
6.1 Vulnerability awareness

As stated in the scope, a vulnerability assessment covers all members of the population at risk including

groups that are less self-reliant such as children, the infirm, the elderly and those with disabilities. The

population at risk often does not realise that it is in fact ‘at risk’ unless the (potential) consequences become

visible. When intentional or incidental CBRN events cannot be prevented, these potential consequences need

to be considered ahead of time in order to initiate measures and pre-position resources that are required to

reduce the adverse effects.

The required level of awareness is often lacking at the level of (organisations responsible for) the population at

risk because most planning, procedures and policies in Europe tend to focus on pre-impact risk management

(prevention) instead of post-impact consequence management (preparedness).

The level of awareness however, is an important factor in determining the capacity of individuals and groups

of individuals (communities) to anticipate, to cope and to recover from CBRN events (community resilience).

Vulnerability awareness requires, amongst others:
 a focus on consequence management;
 attention directed at the psychological-emotional dimensions of risk (“fear”);
 an effective risk/crisis communication strategy;
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 the use of scenarios.
Consequence Management

CBRN agents can cause significant direct and indirect damage to persons, livestock, vegetation and

environment as well as disrupt the system of products and services we need to sustain our daily livelihoods,

i.e. the ‘Critical Infrastructure’.

The European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection, governed by legislative instrument Council

Directive 2008/114/EC [2], defines critical infrastructure as those physical resources, services, and information

technology facilities, networks and infrastructure assets, which, if disrupted or destroyed would have a serious

impact on the health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of two or more member states.

CBRN incidents can mean rapidly cascading consequences in such diverse areas as energy, communication,

transport, food, water, information technology, manufacturing, financial services, health, government services.

Intentional or incidental CBRN events represent a systemic risk not only for their disruption of the critical

infrastructure but also because of the accompanying societal unrest and collapsing public order, safety and

security. The potentially devastating impact depends on factors such as:
 the extent of the geographic area affected (scope);

 effect of time (i.e. the crossing of for example a radiological cloud across borders);

 level of interdependency (i.e. electricity network failure in one MS effecting another);

 severity (degree of the loss): public, economic, environment, political, psychological.

Attention directed at the psychological-emotional dimensions of risk (“fear”)

Policies and measures that are primarily based on scientific data and probabilistic approaches to untoward

events have a tendency to give the population at risk a false sense of security and often fail to increase the

level of vulnerability awareness.

CBRN events however, are likely to induce fear and are perceived as threatening because of their ability to

spread rapidly, unnoticed and in unpredictable patterns.

An effective risk/communications strategy depends largely in the level of trust between public authorities and

the population at risk. Operational experience from the past indicates that an effective risk/communication

strategy should focus on the three questions most often asked by the population at risk:

 What is my/our risk? (also during a crisis)
 What are you doing to help me/us?
 What can I/we do to help ourselves?

When preparing messages related to each of these three questions, each end-user can create their own

subheadings and decide on the most appropriate timing, channels and target audiences of the message.

The use of scenarios

From the perspective of the population at risk, the use of scenarios, particularly when accompanied by media

attention, the use of non-scientific jargon coupled with strong visualisations of the consequences, and the use

of interactive, participatory techniques are often considered to be most effective in raising awareness.

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6.2 Vulnerability management
6.2.1 General approaches

Based on the models and approaches described above, it cannot be emphasised enough that any

organisation involved in CBRN needs to develop its own version of the vulnerability assessment. A general

template for organisations and their management systems is included as Annex A.

Among the lessons learned, on how to approach CBRN vulnerability assessment, awareness and

management from, for example the national government perspective such as is the case in France, the

following practical factors have emerged as worthy to be considered when setting up a vulnerability

management system:

1) Define the desired outcome first and then built in the measures needed to get there.

2) Ensure cross-departmental cooperation at the local level.

3) Ensure it is a framework leaving (local) authorities to deviate when specific circumstances require

this.
4) Define clearly the levels of military involvement (secure, back-up, support).
5) Utilise a scenario and situation-based approach.

Scenarios and situation-based approaches in making CBRN preparations should consider key assumptions

regarding communication, resources, and victims, such as:

 Up to 50 % of personnel may not be available because they left the danger area themselves;

 Due to direct damage or lack of personnel and other resources, multiple sectors of the (local) critical

infrastructure may not be functioning, such as communication, logistics and transport, water, food and

energy;
 Victims will arrive with little or no warning to the treatment facility;

 Societal disruption can cause major problems with maintaining public order and safety;

 Information regarding the hazardous agent(s) will not be available immediately;

 A large number of victims will be self-referred (as many as 80 percent of the total number of victims);

 Victims will not necessarily have been decontaminated prior to arriving at treatment facilities;

 A high percentage of people arriving at a treatment facility will have little or no actual exposure and this

eventuality should be considered in decontamination plans;

 Most victims will go to treatment facilities closest to the site where the emergency occurred;

 Victims will attempt to use other entrances to treatment facilities in addition to designated ones, such as

the emergency department (ED) of a hospital.
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Table 1 — Example of a listing of measures for the protection of population at risk by government

(gov) and/or population (pop)
Pre-attack Vulnerability Reduction Measures
gov pop
Safe procedures for handling, storage, shipping, packaging, information flow X

a Assess by intelligence the chemical threat, potential risk, and likelihood of attack X

b Implement coordinated CBRN-defence plan (procedures/responsibilities/budget) X
Select and obtain necessary equipment X
c Conduct training individual and collective, do expectation management X X
d Designate proposed decontamination sites X X
e Designate and prepare shelters. X X
f Prepare to provide first aid for casualties X X
g Conduct medical coordination of warning, establishing a baseline X
h Determine and implement the appropriate personal protection level. X X
i Minimise skin exposure. X
j Continue good hygiene and sanitation practices. X
k Deploy and activate detectors. X

lL Watch for attack indicators (see/smell a chemical cloud or release of agent). X X

m Cover unprotected mission-essential equipment. X
n Establish local procedures for reporting and declaring an “all clear.” X
During-Attack Vulnerability Reduction Actions
Alarm, inform and update (mutual and internal) X X

o Adhere to Attack Warnings, take cover and use protective measures. Warn and assist X X

bystanders to leave contaminated area perpendicular to the wind
p Avoid potentially contaminated surfaces and areas. X
q Obtain and report observations or evidence of an attack. X X

r Survey, control, and mitigate health hazards. Distribute means, Ensure that personnel X X

perform immediate decontamination and self- and buddy-aid.

s Adjust to lowest possible protection level consistent with the threat assessment. X X

t Document individual exposure by Medical staffs. X
u Sample, monitor, and analyse the area for residual hazard. X
v Plan and implement decontamination and conta
...

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