Vehicle security barriers

IWA 14-2:2013 provides guidance for the selection, installation and use of vehicle security barriers (VSBs) and describes the process of producing operational requirements (ORs). It also gives guidance on a design method for assessing the performance of a VSB.

Barrières de sécurité de véhicule

General Information

Status
Published
Publication Date
14-Nov-2013
Current Stage
6060 - International Standard published
Start Date
26-Jul-2013
Completion Date
15-Nov-2013
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INTERNATIONAL IWA
WORKSHOP 14-2
AGREEMENT
First edition
2013-11-15
Corrected version
2014-01-15
Vehicle security barriers —
Part 2:
Application
Barrières de sécurité de véhicule —
Partie 2: Applications
Reference number
IWA 14-2:2013(E)
ISO 2013
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IWA 14-2:2013(E)
COPYRIGHT PROTECTED DOCUMENT
© ISO 2013

All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, no part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized otherwise in any form

or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, or posting on the internet or an intranet, without prior

written permission. Permission can be requested from either ISO at the address below or ISO’s member body in the country of

the requester.
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Published in Switzerland
ii © ISO 2013 – All rights reserved
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IWA 14-2:2013(E)
Contents Page

Foreword ..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................v

Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................vi

1 Scope ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 1

2 Introduction to hostile vehicle mitigation ................................................................................................................................. 1

2.1 General ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1

2.2 Selection of a VSB .................................................................................................................................................................................. 3

3 The threat .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3

3.1 Identify and quantify the threat ............................................................................................................................................... 3

3.2 Duration of deployment .................................................................................................................................................................. 4

4 Assets ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 4

4.1 Identification of the critical assets ......................................................................................................................................... 4

4.2 Identification of stakeholders .................................................................................................................................................... 4

4.3 Consideration of collateral damage ...................................................................................................................................... 5

5 Site assessment ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5

5.1 Review of existing security arrangements ...................................................................................................................... 5

5.2 Site survey ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5

5.3 Civil works .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 6

5.4 Traffic survey ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 8

6 Site design .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9

6.1 Traffic management ............................................................................................................................................................................ 9

6.2 Aesthetics .................................................................................................................................................................................................10

7 VSB performance ...............................................................................................................................................................................................10

7.1 Impact performance ........................................................................................................................................................................10

7.2 Vehicle speed .........................................................................................................................................................................................11

7.3 Impact angle ...........................................................................................................................................................................................12

7.4 Vehicle penetration distance and major debris distance/coordinates ...............................................12

7.5 Operational performance............................................................................................................................................................12

8 Procurement strategy ..................................................................................................................................................................................16

8.1 General ........................................................................................................................................................................................................16

8.2 Availability and maintenance of the VSB .......................................................................................................................16

8.3 Quality .........................................................................................................................................................................................................16

8.4 Cost .................................................................................................................................................................................................................16

8.5 Commissioning and handover ................................................................................................................................................17

9 Deployment and removal .........................................................................................................................................................................17

9.1 Highway/local authority approval ......................................................................................................................................17

9.2 Logistics of deployment ...............................................................................................................................................................17

9.3 Installation ...............................................................................................................................................................................................17

9.4 Lifting and placement ....................................................................................................................................................................18

9.5 Removal considerations ...............................................................................................................................................................18

10 Types of VSB ...........................................................................................................................................................................................................18

10.1 General ........................................................................................................................................................................................................18

10.2 Passive VSBs ...........................................................................................................................................................................................18

10.3 Active VSBs ..............................................................................................................................................................................................18

10.4 Examples of passive VSBs ...........................................................................................................................................................19

10.5 Examples of active VSBs ...............................................................................................................................................................21

11 Active VSBs ...............................................................................................................................................................................................................25

11.1 General ........................................................................................................................................................................................................25

11.2 Categories of active VSBs ............................................................................................................................................................26

11.3 Layout of active VSBs at VACPs ..............................................................................................................................................28

11.4 Safety issues ...........................................................................................................................................................................................31

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IWA 14-2:2013(E)

11.5 Training ......................................................................................................................................................................................................33

11.6 Maintenance, service and inspection ................................................................................................................................33

11.7 Control system......................................................................................................................................................................................34

12 Operational requirements ......................................................................................................................................................................34

12.1 General ........................................................................................................................................................................................................34

12.2 Level 2 OR proforma .......................................................................................................................................................................37

Annex A (informative) Level 2 operational requirement (OR) proforma ...................................................................38

Annex B (informative) Design method ............................................................................................................................................................53

Annex C (informative) Modifications to the VSB ...................................................................................................................................56

Bibliography .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................57

iv © ISO 2013 – All rights reserved
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IWA 14-2:2013(E)
Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards

bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out

through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical

committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International

organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work.

ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of

electrotechnical standardization.

The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are

described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular the different approval criteria needed for the

different types of ISO documents should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the

editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of

patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. Details of

any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or

on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents).

Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not

constitute an endorsement.

For an explanation on the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity

assessment, as well as information about ISO’s adherence to the WTO principles in the Technical Barriers

to Trade (TBT) see the following URL: Foreword - Supplementary information

International Workshop Agreement IWA 14 was sponsored by UK Government’s Centre for the Protection

of National Infrastructure (CPNI) on behalf of the international community. The development of this

IWA was facilitated by BSI Standards Limited. It came into effect on 15 November 2013.

IWA 14 consists of the following parts, under the general title Vehicle security barriers:

— Part 1: Performance requirement, vehicle impact test method and performance rating

— Part 2: Application
This corrected version of IWA 14-2:2013 incorporates editorial modifications.
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IWA 14-2:2013(E)
Introduction
0.1 Workshop contributors

Acknowledgement is given to the following organizations that were involved in the development of this

International Workshop Agreement:
— Allen Total Perimeter Security Limited
— APT Security Systems
— ATG Access Ltd
— BRE Global Limited
— Bristorm, Hill and Smith Ltd
— Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI)
— DELTA BLOC International GmbH
— GME Springs/Safetyflex Barriers
— Heald Limited
— HMS Nelson, Portsmouth Naval base
— Kirchdorfer Fertigteilholding GmbH
— L.I.E.R.
— Marshalls
— MFD International Limited

— Ministry of Commerce and Industry – Director General for Standards and Metrology (DGSM)

(Sultanate of Oman)
— MIRA Ltd
— Norwegian Defence Estates Agency
— Perimeter Protection Group
— Perimeter Security Suppliers Association
— Rhino Engineering Ltd
— Royal Military Academy - Civil and Materials Engineering Department
— RSSI Barriers
— Sälzer GmbH
— Scorpion Arresting Systems LTD
— Ministry of Home Affairs (Singapore)
— Sudanese Standard and Metrology Organization (SSMO)
— Syrian Arab Organization for Standardization and Metrology (SASMO)
— Tallwang KVI PTY Ltd t/a AVS-elli
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IWA 14-2:2013(E)
— Technical and Test Institute for Construction Prague
— Texas A&M Transportation Institute
— Transport Research Laboratory (TRL)
— US. Department of State
— US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
— US. Army Corps of Engineers – Protective Design Center
0.2 Relationship with other publications

The following documents have been used to inform the development of this part of IWA 14:

— ASTM F 2656
— CWA 16221
— PAS 69
— PAS 68
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International Workshop Agreement IWA 14-2:2013(E)
Vehicle security barriers —
Part 2:
Application
1 Scope

This part of IWA 14 provides guidance for the selection, installation and use of vehicle security barriers

(VSBs) and describes the process of producing operational requirements (ORs).

It also gives guidance on a design method for assessing the performance of a VSB.

2 Introduction to hostile vehicle mitigation
2.1 General

2.1.1 Vehicle-borne threats can range from the use of a vehicle for vandalism to determined attacks

by adversaries (e.g. criminals and terrorists). The mobility and payload capacity of a vehicle can offer

a tactical means to deliver a large explosive device and/or carry adversaries with attack tools. Hostile

vehicles can be parked, manoeuvred or rammed in to or out of a site. Entry to, or exit from, a site can

also involve surreptitious tampering with VSBs or their control apparatus, or the targeted placement of

small explosive charges to breach the integrity of a barrier structure. Clear definition of the threat and

the potential attack scenarios should be considered when deciding which methods of attack to defend

against and consequently the most appropriate countermeasures.

2.1.2 The mitigation of all forms of vehicle-borne threat can be difficult while satisfying other busi-

ness needs. The following should be considered as a minimum:
a) security:
1) the level of residual risk is deemed acceptable by the organization;
2) attack method to be mitigated;
3) countermeasures;
4) response to increased threat conditions;
5) enforceable stand-off distance;
b) business needs:

1) lifetime cost (training, manning levels, service, maintenance and replacement);

2) traffic management;
3) appearance;
4) internal and external stakeholder requirements;
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IWA 14-2:2013(E)
5) security risks induced by safety concerns or systems;
c) engineering constraints:
1) architectural;
2) foundations;
3) buried services;
4) land ownership and available space;

5) local authority planning restriction(s) (e.g. height/weight/noise restrictions of area of land,

utilities).

2.1.3 It is important that a security operational requirement (OR) (see Clause 12) is developed in con-

junction with a user requirement document (URD) and that all key stakeholders are involved from the

outset.

2.1.4 The considered elements (i.e. security ORs, user requirements) can adversely influence each

other. Therefore early consideration of acceptable compromises should be made, particularly with re-

gard to the security and safety aspects of the VSBs.

2.1.5 There is likely to be a need to prevent unauthorized vehicle movement, to allow the safe, se-

cure and timely transit of legitimate vehicles. Additionally, long-term security issues relating to system

reliability and a change in threat level can also compromise the initial ORs. An unreliable VSB is unac-

ceptable and has additional implications that may include costly compensatory measures to correct the

condition. A change in threat can result in heightened security response levels and VSBs and procedures

that cannot operate either safely or securely in that new environment.
NOTE See Clause 12 for further information on ORs.

2.1.6 Risk assessments should be conducted for safety and security early in the project design phase

of project planning and after final installation to ensure the level of risk acceptable to the site is estab-

lished and maintained. These assessments should be shared with or jointly produced by the stakehold-

ers (e.g. site owner, security and safety representatives, project manager, staff association). The early

engagement with the stakeholders can facilitate the development of business cases and can help identify

potential issues, associated costs and constraints.

2.1.7 Often vehicular access has to be provided through the VSB line. The vehicles should be searched

or be of known authenticity before arriving at the vehicle access control point (VACP). In this instance a

single or multiple access point may be provided through the stand-off barrier line, e.g. rising, swing or

sliding gate barriers. Where the stand-off measure forms the site boundary or site secure perimeter, the

VACP then typically becomes the first point of challenge for all vehicles.

2.1.8 Regardless of the type of active VSB installed, a secondary access control point should be consid-

ered. This is to ensure that where the VSBs fail or there is an incident at the main VACP, traffic can easily

be diverted to the secondary location. This location should be able to accommodate the traffic volumes

typical to the main VACP while maintaining the same level of operational security.

2.1.9 Where an entrance has more than one VSB, for example a separate entry barrier and exit barrier,

then each VSB should have independent drive and control systems. This is to prevent a cascade or nodal

failure as a result of one VSB developing a fault. They may share the same user interface, hydraulic cir-

cuits and electrical systems, but should be designed so that its failure does not disable all VACPs. Provi-

sion of an uninterruptable power supply (UPS) or standby generator should also be considered.

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IWA 14-2:2013(E)
2.2 Selection of a VSB

2.2.1 The selection of a VSB is dependent on a number of factors, including but not limited to:

a) the threat (Clause 3);
b) the assets to be protected (Clause 4);
c) the site (Clauses 5 and 6);
d) the required performance of the VSB (Clause 7);
e) the procurement strategy (Clause 8);
f) deployment and removal of the VSB (Clause 9);
g) the type of VSB required (Clauses 10 and 11).

2.2.2 The decision process for the selection of VSBs is illustrated in the flow diagrams in Clause 12,

which covers ORs.
3 The threat
3.1 Identify and quantify the threat

3.1.1 Review any previous terrorist, criminal or malicious incidents and consider their relevance to

your site regarding the target and attack methods used.
NOTE Contact your national, regional or local security force.

3.1.2 There are five main types of vehicle-borne threat. All can be deployed with or without the use of

suicide operatives.

a) Parked vehicles – where unscreened vehicles are parked adjacent to a site, in underground parking

facilities or overlooking a site.

b) Encroachment (exploiting gaps in defences) – where a hostile vehicle is negotiated through an

incomplete line of barriers or an incorrectly spaced line of barriers without the need to impact.

An alternative form of encroachment attack is exploitation of an active barrier system at a vehicle

access control point (VACP) by a hostile vehicle “tailgating” a legitimate vehicle.

c) Penetrative attacks – where the front or rear of the hostile vehicle is used as a ram.

d) Deception techniques – a “Trojan” vehicle (one whose model, livery or registration is familiar to

the site), or where hostile occupants negotiating their way through by pretence or by using stolen

(or cloned) access control or ID passes. Alternative scenarios include an unwitting “mule”, a driver

unknowingly delivering an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) surreptitiously planted in their

vehicle by an attacker, or an “insider” bringing an IED in to their own work site. Deception techniques

prey on human and operational weaknesses.

e) Duress techniques – the driver of a legitimate vehicle is forced to carry an IED or where a guard

controlling a VACP is forced to allow a vehicle entry. These are perhaps the most difficult forms of

vehicle borne threat to defend against.

3.1.3 Site design can also accommodate countermeasures for layered attack scenarios using one or

more of the threat types given in 3.1.2 a) to e), for instance, the use of a first hostile vehicle to create a

gap by way of penetrative attack or blast which then allows a second to encroach through.

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IWA 14-2:2013(E)
3.1.4 Potential threats to be considered:
a) whether the vehicle is parked outside or inside the security perimeter;
b) size of vehicle (both largest and smallest);
c) speed and direction of approach.
3.2 Duration of deployment

3.2.1 The period for which security measures is required (design life) should be defined.

3.2.2 Assess whether the security measures are to be operated continuously or occasionally. Decide

whether a permanent, semi-permanent or temporary installation is required and identify the level of

protection that the security measure is required to provide. Decide how and where the system is to be

controlled from, i.e. controlled locally by guard, from a central control room or through the use of auto-

matic access control systems (AACS).

3.2.3 A permanent installation is a physical measure, which may require significant civil engineering

works and is expected to remain for the life of the asset.

3.2.4 A temporary installation is a physical measure that may be deployed on the basis that it remains

in situ for a short period of time. The extent of the remedial measures required upon removal are kept to

a minimum.

3.2.5 A semi-permanent installation is defined as a hybrid installation that incorporates some transi-

tory elements that can be retracted or removed leaving any permanent foundation or anchorage in situ.

3.2.6 Assess and review at regular intervals whether the security measures need to be adapted to a

change in the threat.
4 Assets
4.1 Identification of the critical assets

4.1.1 The assets to be protected should be identified, i.e. machinery, infrastructure, equipment, one or

more buildings, an area, public event, or crowded place.
4.1.2 If more than one asset is identified, they should be prioritized.

4.1.3 It should be determined whether there is an existing defensible security perimeter and whether

there is a need to establish a temporary or permanent perimeter security scheme.

4.1.4 The physical VSB strategy may be coordinated with adjacent interested parties.

4.2 Identification of stakeholders

The contact information should be obtained for all stakeholders who may be affected by the proposed

security measures. These include but are not limited to staff, deliveries, local authorities, public transport,

emergency services, utility companies, highway authorities, architects, neighbours and landlords.

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IWA 14-2:2013(E)
4.3 Consideration of collateral damage

4.3.1 The consequences of a successful attack and the likely disruption in terms of loss of life, damage,

delays, perception and business and financial impact should be assessed.

4.3.2 Locations or other assets which might suffer collateral damage, short- or long-term disruption

to their operations from a successful attack should be identified. For example:

a) neighbouring buildings (e.g. government, military, residential, business, emergency services,

schools, religious sites or other assets);
b) people;
c) major communication networks (above and below ground);
d) control rooms;

e) electricity, water and gas lines or storage facilities (above and below ground);

f) underground tunnels, basements and subways;
g) ventilation shafts;
h) bridges;
i) public transport infrastructure and airports.

4.3.3 Other locations/assets that might become alternative targets if the security strategy being em-

ployed at the principal asset is effective should be identified.
5 Site assessment
5.1 Review of existing security arrangements

Once the site security plans have been implemented that establish the acceptable level of security risk, a

change control process should be adopted for any proposed site changes (e.g. site infrastructure, safety

related, physical security related, VSB hardware and procedures) to ensure an acceptable level of risk is

maintained. As part of the configuration control process, an analysis should be performed that ensures

that acceptance of the proposed change does not reduce the effectiveness of the previous site security

plans.
5.2 Site survey

5.2.1 All possible approach routes along which a hostile vehicle could challenge a VSB o

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