kSIST FprEN IEC 63452:2026
(Main)Railway applications - Cybersecurity
- Status
- Not Published
- Public Enquiry End Date
- 30-Sep-2025
- Technical Committee
- ŽEN - Electrical applications for railways
- Current Stage
- 5020 - Formal vote (FV) (Adopted Project)
- Start Date
- 10-Nov-2026
- Due Date
- 29-Dec-2026
kSIST FprEN IEC 63452:2026 is a SIST standard on railway applications cybersecurity. It specifies a consistent approach for managing cybersecurity in railway systems, including railway networks, urban transport, maglev transport, rolling stock, fixed installations, and operational management systems. It is intended for railway duty holders, asset owners, system integrators, maintenance service providers, and product suppliers who need to define, assess, design, assure, operate, and maintain cybersecurity for railway applications.
What does kSIST FprEN IEC 63452:2026 specify?
kSIST FprEN IEC 63452:2026 specifies how to manage cybersecurity for railway applications across the railway system and its operational environment. It adapts the IEC 62443 series to the railway domain and covers cybersecurity management, zoning, risk management, supply chain management, cybersecurity requirements, cybersecurity assurance, and operational, maintenance, and decommissioning requirements.
The document also gives guidance for legacy systems and for coordinating cybersecurity activities with the railway RAMS life cycle in IEC FDIS 62278-1:2024. It does not provide safety requirements or safety case constraints, but it does address the relationship between cybersecurity and safety.
Clause 1 defines the scope, clause 2 has no normative references, clause 3 covers terms, abbreviations, taxonomy, and terms equivalence, and clauses 4 to 10 cover the main lifecycle topics. The annexes add design guidance, examples, and supporting material.
| Annex | What it covers |
|---|---|
| Annex A | Conduits and protection profiles for conduits |
| Annex B | Handling legacy systems, including risks, process activities, and countermeasures |
| Annex C | Cybersecurity design principles and guidance for implementation in a railway environment |
| Annex D | Safety and cybersecurity |
| Annex E | Risk acceptance methods, with worked examples |
| Annex F | Design guidance for system models, zone models, and train to ground communication |
| Annex G | Example contents of key cybersecurity deliverables |
| Annex H | Cybersecurity competence profiles |
| Annex I | Access strategy, remote maintenance, data protection, portable media, and key exchange |
| Annex J | Vulnerability management and remediation |
| Annex K | Cloud security across the railway application life cycle |
What are the key requirements of kSIST FprEN IEC 63452:2026?
Clause 4 - describe the railway system from a cybersecurity point of view
Clause 4 requires a clear cybersecurity-oriented description of the railway system. It asks the railway duty holder to identify the railway system, the subsystems that make it up, their physical or topological distribution, and a high-level railway zone model.
In practice, this matters because cybersecurity work starts with knowing what is in scope and how it is connected. Clause 4 also addresses shared cybersecurity services within the railway system, so teams can see which protections are common and which are local to a particular application or solution.
Clause 5 - run cybersecurity as an organizational programme
Clause 5 sets out enterprise cybersecurity programme and management requirements for OT systems. It calls for a railway OT cybersecurity policy, a railway OT cybersecurity programme, and documented processes for information sharing, competency management, inventory management, supply chain management, risk management, business continuity management, and data protection management.
This is the organizational layer that sits above a single project. It matters in practice because cybersecurity activities need to work before, during, and after a project, and different organizations - asset owner, system integrator, and maintenance service provider - may each own part of the work.
Clause 6 - align cybersecurity with the railway application life cycle
Clause 6 requires cybersecurity activities to be managed through the railway application life cycle and coordinated with IEC FDIS 62278-1:2024. It covers the management of cybersecurity activities and interfaces, and it maps those activities to life cycle phases and deliverables.
The document distinguishes between the railway application life cycle and the product life cycle. That separation matters because product suppliers may use their own secure development standards, while the railway application still needs the security interfaces, deliverables, and handover evidence needed for operation.
Clause 7 - assess risk by zones and conduits
Clause 7 adapts the IEC 62443-3-2 risk assessment approach to railways. It starts by identifying the system under consideration (SUC) and its security context, then partitions the SUC into zones and conduits, compares the risks, performs a detailed risk assessment, documents cybersecurity requirements, and ends with asset owner approval.
Clause 7 allows three ways to address a threat: use a code of practice, compare with a reference system, or perform explicit risk evaluation. In practice, this lets teams choose the method that fits the system and the threat, but the result still has to be a documented cybersecurity requirements specification.
Clause 8 - turn risk results into architecture and configuration
Clause 8 defines the SUC cybersecurity functional architecture, the apportionment of cybersecurity requirements to subsystems and components, and the integration and configuration requirements. It includes traceability of requirements, inclusion of compensating countermeasures, and cybersecurity guidelines for the railway solution.
This is where the risk work becomes an implementable design. The clause matters because security requirements must be assigned to real subsystems and settings, and the resulting architecture must not adversely affect essential functions.
Clause 9 - verify, validate, and accept the railway solution
Clause 9 covers cybersecurity assurance, including verification and validation and railway solution acceptance. The main input is the cybersecurity requirements specification together with the identified security-related application conditions, and the main output is the railway solution cybersecurity case.
That case collects the assurance evidence needed for handover. In practice, this gives the asset owner a documented basis for deciding whether the railway solution is ready for operational use.
Clause 10 - keep security working in operation and retirement
Clause 10 covers operational, maintenance, and decommissioning requirements. It includes a cybersecurity maintenance plan, continuous verification, an updated cybersecurity case, risk assessment updates, vulnerability management, patch management, incident management, security monitoring, and decommissioning management.
This clause matters because railway cybersecurity is not finished at handover. The document expects security to be maintained throughout operation and changed with the same discipline used during design and acceptance.
Annexes A, C, E, F, G, H, I, J, and K - practical guidance and examples
The annexes add supporting material that helps implement the main clauses. Annex A explains conduit types and protection profiles. Annex C gives cybersecurity design principles such as defence in depth, least privilege, secure defaults, and secure metadata. Annex E provides example risk acceptance methods, including impact and likelihood assessments and a likelihood calculation formula. Annex F expands the zone model with examples, including landside, rolling stock, and train to ground communication. Annex G gives example contents for deliverables, Annex H gives competence profiles, Annex I covers access and maintenance topics, Annex J covers vulnerability management, and Annex K covers cloud security through the life cycle.
What terms does kSIST FprEN IEC 63452:2026 define?
- System under consideration (SUC) - the railway solution or part of the railway system that is being defined, designed, assessed, and protected for cybersecurity.
- Cybersecurity requirements specification (CRS) - the document that records the cybersecurity requirements derived from the risk assessment and used for design and assurance.
- Security-related application conditions (SecRACs) - conditions that must be met in operation or use so the cybersecurity measures remain valid.
- Operational technology (OT) - the systems and equipment used to operate the railway application in its operating environment.
- Cybersecurity management system (CSMS) - the organized set of processes used to manage cybersecurity activities and controls.
- Asset owner (AO) - the organization responsible for the railway asset and for key decisions such as acceptance.
- Defence in depth - a layered security approach that uses several independent methods so that one control does not stand alone.
Who uses kSIST FprEN IEC 63452:2026?
Railway duty holders and asset owners use this standard to define security policy, set risk criteria, approve residual risk, and accept the railway solution. System integrators use it to build the zone and conduit model, define the cybersecurity architecture, generate the CRS, and prepare the cybersecurity case.
Maintenance service providers use it for the cybersecurity maintenance plan, vulnerability handling, patching, incident response, and decommissioning. Product suppliers use it to understand the railway interface with their own secure development and assurance activities. It is relevant to railway networks, metros, tramways, trolleybuses, fully automated transport systems, and magnetic levitated transport systems.
What changed in kSIST FprEN IEC 63452:2026 from the previous edition?
The cover note states that this A version shows aligned Word extraction from the OSD for annexes and figures, the closing date for voting was extended to 2025-10-17, and no technical modification has been made. The Slovene standard is identified as identical with prEN IEC 63452:2025.
Which standards are used with kSIST FprEN IEC 63452:2026?
kSIST FprEN IEC 63452:2026 has no normative references, but it explicitly uses and adapts several related standards:
| Standard | What it contributes |
|---|---|
| IEC 62443 series | The main cybersecurity framework adapted to the railway domain |
| IEC 62443-3-2:2020 | Basis for the railway risk assessment process in Clause 7 |
| IEC 62443-3-3:2013/COR1:2014 | Basis for the foundational cybersecurity requirements and design guidance in Annex C |
| IEC 62443-4-1:2018 | Secure development life cycle guidance for product suppliers |
| IEC 62443-4-2:2019/COR1:2022 | Companion requirements for products and component security |
| IEC FDIS 62278-1:2024 | RAMS life cycle used for coordinating cybersecurity activities |
| IEC 62290-1:2014 | Example of a railway system description approach for urban rail transport |
| NIST SP 800-218, NIST SP 800-82, NIST SP 800-160 Vol1 | Examples of other standards or frameworks product suppliers may use |
What does the kSIST FprEN IEC 63452:2026 document contain?
The document contains a structured set of clauses, figures, tables, and annexes that support cybersecurity work across the railway life cycle. Figures show the railway system taxonomy, IT and OT segregation, area-based and topology-based models, a high-level zone model, the cybersecurity management system, the V-cycle, and risk assessment flowcharts.
Annex E includes example risk acceptance methods, including matrices and a likelihood formula. Annex C includes a large table that adapts IEC 62443-3-3 requirements to the railway context, while Annex G gives example contents for the main deliverables such as the cybersecurity management plan, risk assessment report, CRS, cybersecurity guidelines, evaluation plan, cybersecurity case, and maintenance plan.
Relations
- Effective Date
- 13-Oct-2026
- Effective Date
- 05-Aug-2025
Get Certified
Connect with accredited certification bodies for this standard

BSI Group
BSI (British Standards Institution) is the business standards company that helps organizations make excellence a habit.

Bureau Veritas
Bureau Veritas is a world leader in laboratory testing, inspection and certification services.

DNV
DNV is an independent assurance and risk management provider.
Sponsored listings
Frequently Asked Questions
kSIST FprEN IEC 63452:2026 is a draft published by the Slovenian Institute for Standardization (SIST). Its full title is "Railway applications - Cybersecurity". This standard covers: Railway applications - Cybersecurity
Railway applications - Cybersecurity
kSIST FprEN IEC 63452:2026 is classified under the following ICS (International Classification for Standards) categories: 35.030 - IT Security; 45.020 - Railway engineering in general. The ICS classification helps identify the subject area and facilitates finding related standards.
kSIST FprEN IEC 63452:2026 has the following relationships with other standards: It is inter standard links to SIST EN 50159:2026, SIST-TS CLC/TS 50701:2024. Understanding these relationships helps ensure you are using the most current and applicable version of the standard.
kSIST FprEN IEC 63452:2026 is available in PDF format for immediate download after purchase. The document can be added to your cart and obtained through the secure checkout process. Digital delivery ensures instant access to the complete standard document.
Standards Content (Sample)
SLOVENSKI STANDARD
oSIST prEN IEC 63452:2025
01-september-2025
Železniške naprave - Kibernetska varnost
Railway applications - Cybersecurity
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: prEN IEC 63452:2025
ICS:
35.030 Informacijska varnost IT Security
45.020 Železniška tehnika na Railway engineering in
splošno general
oSIST prEN IEC 63452:2025 en
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.
oSIST prEN IEC 63452:2025
oSIST prEN IEC 63452:2025
9/3232A/CDV
COMMITTEE DRAFT FOR VOTE (CDV)
PROJECT NUMBER:
IEC 63452 ED1
DATE OF CIRCULATION: CLOSING DATE FOR VOTING:
2025-08-08 (2025-07-18) 2025-10-17 (2025-10-10)
SUPERSEDES DOCUMENTS:
9/3000/CD, 9/3036A/CC
IEC TC 9 : ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS FOR RAILWAYS
SECRETARIAT: SECRETARY:
France Mr Denis MIGLIANICO
OF INTEREST TO THE FOLLOWING COMMITTEES: HORIZONTAL FUNCTION(S):
TC 65
ASPECTS CONCERNED:
Information security and data privacy
SUBMITTED FOR CENELEC PARALLEL VOTING NOT SUBMITTED FOR CENELEC PARALLEL VOTING
Attention IEC-CENELEC parallel voting
The attention of IEC National Committees, members of CENELEC, is
drawn to the fact that this Committee Draft for Vote (CDV) is submitted
for parallel voting.
The CENELEC members are invited to vote through the CENELEC
online voting system.
This document is still under study and subject to change. It should not be used for reference purposes.
Recipients of this document are invited to submit, with their comments, notification of any relevant patent rights of which they are
aware and to provide supporting documentation.
Recipients of this document are invited to submit, with their comments, notification of any relevant “In Some Countries” clauses to
be included should this proposal proceed. Recipients are reminded that the CDV stage is the final stage for submitting ISC clauses.
(SEE AC/22/2007 OR NEW GUIDANCE DOC).
TITLE:
Railway applications – Cybersecurity
PROPOSED STABILITY DATE: 2028
NOTE FROM TC/SC OFFICERS:
This A version shows aligned Word extraction from the OSD in regards of annexes and figures. The closing date for
voting has been extended to 2025-10-17. No technical modification has been made.
st
The Cenelec parallel vote status of this project has been changed on 1 of August, as reflected on this coverpage.
electronic file, to make a copy and to print out the content for the sole purpose of preparing National Committee positions.
You may not copy or "mirror" the file or printed version of the document, or any part of it, for any other purpose without
permission in writing from IEC.
oSIST prEN IEC 63452:2025
Link to Committee Draft for Vote (CDV) online document:
https://osd.iec.ch/#/editor/archive/0e847a8f-d663-e6d5-e063-1710000a30d0/en/CCDV/1
How to access
This link leads you to the Online Standards Development (OSD) platform for National Mirror Committee’s
(NMC) comments. The project draft may be found further down this document.
Resource materials
We recommend NCs to review the available materials to better understand the member commenting on the
OSD platform. This includes the:
• OSD NC roles overview: here
• How to add and submit comments to the IEC: here
Contact
Should you require any assistance, please contact the IEC IT Helpdesk at helpdesk@iec.ch.
oSIST prEN IEC 63452:2025
IEC CDV 63452 ED1 © IEC 2025
CONTENTS
CONTENTS . 1
FOREWORD . 13
Introduction. 15
Purpose . 15
Overview of the structure of this document . 15
1 Scope . 17
2 Normative references . 17
3 Terms and definitions, abbreviated terms and acronyms, taxonomy and terms
equivalence . 17
3.1 Terms and definitions. 17
3.2 Abbreviated terms and acronyms . 46
3.3 Railway system taxonomy and terms equivalence . 50
4 Railway system overview . 53
4.1 Purpose . 53
4.2 Overview . 53
4.3 Inputs / Outputs . 54
4.4 [SO-01-01] Identification of the railway system . 54
4.4.1 Requirement . 54
4.4.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 54
4.5 [SO-02-01] Definition of a high-level railway system model . 56
4.5.1 Requirement . 56
4.5.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 56
4.6 [SO-03-01] Definition of a high-level railway zone model . 58
4.6.1 Requirement . 58
4.6.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 58
4.7 [SO-04-01] Specification of shared cybersecurity services . 60
4.7.1 Requirement . 60
4.7.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 60
5 Enterprise cybersecurity programme and management . 62
5.1 Overview . 62
5.2 Inputs / Outputs . 62
5.3 [CP-01-01] Railway OT cybersecurity policy . 63
5.3.1 Requirement . 63
5.3.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 63
5.4 [CP-01-02] Railway OT cybersecurity programme . 63
5.4.1 Requirement . 63
5.4.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 64
5.5 [CP-02-01] Information sharing management . 65
5.5.1 Requirement . 65
5.5.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 65
5.6 [CP-03-01] Competency management . 65
5.6.1 Requirement . 65
5.6.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 66
5.7 [CP-04-01] Inventory management . 66
5.7.1 Requirement . 66
5.7.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 67
oSIST prEN IEC 63452:2025
IEC CDV 63452 ED1 © IEC 2025
5.8 [CP-05-01] Supply chain management . 67
5.8.1 Requirement . 67
5.8.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 67
5.9 [CP-06-01] Risk management . 70
5.9.1 Requirement . 70
5.9.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 71
5.10 [CP-07-01] Business continuity management . 71
5.10.1 Requirement . 71
5.10.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 72
5.11 [CP-08-01] Data protection management . 72
5.11.1 Requirement . 72
5.11.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 73
6 Cybersecurity within a railway application life cycle . 74
6.1 Purpose . 74
6.2 Railway application and product life cycles . 74
6.3 Manage cybersecurity activities and interfaces . 74
6.3.1 Inputs / Outputs . 74
6.3.2 [LC-01-01] Assign Project Cybersecurity Manager . 74
6.3.3 [LC-02-01] Plan project cybersecurity activities till the handover . 75
6.3.4 [LC-02-02] Tailoring the cybersecurity management plan . 76
6.3.5 [LC-02-03] Cybersecurity management plan approval . 76
6.3.6 [LC-02-04] Management of security issues before handover . 77
6.3.7 [LC-03-01] Manage product suppliers . 77
6.3.8 [LC-04-01] Manage interaction with safety and RAM teams . 77
6.4 Cybersecurity activities mapping to the IEC 62278-1 life cycle . 78
7 Risk assessment for system design . 83
7.1 Purpose and outcome . 83
7.2 Overview . 83
7.3 Identify the SUC and its security context . 86
7.3.1 Description . 86
7.3.2 Inputs / Outputs . 86
7.3.3 [ZR-01-01] Identify the SUC, its security perimeter and access points . 86
7.3.4 [ZR-01-02] Identify the cybersecurity context . 87
7.4 Initial Risk Assessment . 89
7.4.1 Description . 89
7.4.2 Inputs / Outputs . 89
7.4.3 [ZR-02-01] Initial risk assessment . 89
7.5 Partitioning of the SUC in zones and conduits . 90
7.5.1 Description . 90
7.5.2 Inputs / Outputs . 90
7.5.3 [ZR-03-01] Partitioning of the SUC . 90
7.6 Risk comparison . 91
7.6.1 Description . 91
7.6.2 Inputs / Outputs . 91
7.6.3 [ZR-04-01] Compare initial risk with tolerable risk . 91
7.7 Detailed Risk Assessment . 92
7.7.1 Description . 92
7.7.2 Inputs / Outputs . 92
7.7.3 [ZR-05-01] Perform Detailed Risk Assessment . 92
oSIST prEN IEC 63452:2025
IEC CDV 63452 ED1 © IEC 2025
7.7.4 [ZR-05-02] Identify threats . 93
7.7.5 [ZR-05-03] Identify vulnerabilities . 94
7.7.6 [ZR-05-04] Manage identified threats and vulnerabilities . 95
7.7.7 [ZR-05-05] Apply a code of practice . 95
7.7.8 [ZR-05-06] Application requirements from a reference system . 95
7.7.9 Explicit Risk Evaluation [ZR-05-07, ZR-05-08, ZR-05-09] . 96
7.7.10 [ZR-05-10] Threats coverage and risk acceptance . 100
7.7.11 [ZR-05-11] Document results of the Detailed Risk Assessment . 100
7.8 Document cyber security requirements . 101
7.8.1 Description . 101
7.8.2 Inputs / Outputs . 101
7.8.3 [ZR-06-01] Cybersecurity requirements specification . 101
7.9 Asset owner's approval . 103
7.9.1 Description . 103
7.9.2 Inputs / Outputs . 103
7.9.3 [ZR-07-01] Asset owner's approval . 103
8 Cybersecurity architecture, integration and configuration . 103
8.1 Purpose . 103
8.2 Inputs / Outputs . 103
8.3 SUC cybersecurity functional architecture . 104
8.3.1 [AA-01-01] Cybersecurity Architecture . 104
8.3.2 [AA-01-02] Cybersecurity shall not adversely impact essential functions . 104
8.3.3 [AA-01-03] Requirements apportionment to subsystems . 105
8.3.4 [AA-01-04] Inclusion of compensating countermeasures . 106
8.3.5 [AA-01-05] Cybersecurity requirement traceability . 106
8.4 Cybersecurity integration . 106
8.4.1 [AA-02-01] Cybersecurity guidelines for the railway solution . 106
8.5 Cybersecurity configuration . 107
8.5.1 [AA-03-01] Cybersecurity parameterization and configuration of the
railway solution . 107
9 Cybersecurity assurance for railway solutions . 107
9.1 Purpose . 107
9.2 Overview . 108
9.3 Cybersecurity verification and validation . 109
9.3.1 Description . 109
9.3.2 Inputs / Outputs . 109
9.3.3 [CA-01-01] Plan cybersecurity evaluation activities . 110
9.3.4 [CA-01-02] Independence of security testers . 111
9.3.5 [CA-01-03] Execution of cybersecurity evaluation activities. 111
9.3.6 [CA-01-04] Verification of cybersecurity deliverables . 112
9.3.7 [CA-01-05] Cybersecurity validation of the railway solution . 112
9.3.8 [CA-01-06] Railway solution cybersecurity case . 113
9.4 Railway solution acceptance . 114
9.4.1 Description . 114
9.4.2 Inputs / Outputs . 114
9.4.3 [CA-02-01] Establish cybersecurity handover plan . 115
9.4.4 [CA-02-02] Approval of the cybersecurity handover plan . 115
9.4.5 [CA-02-03] Approval of the cybersecurity case . 116
9.4.6 [CA-02-04] Perform cybersecurity handover. 116
oSIST prEN IEC 63452:2025
IEC CDV 63452 ED1 © IEC 2025
10 Operational, maintenance and decommissioning requirements . 116
10.1 Overview . 116
10.2 Inputs / Outputs . 118
10.3 [OM-01-01] Cybersecurity maintenance plan . 119
10.3.1 Requirement . 119
10.3.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 119
10.4 [OM-01-02] Cybersecurity rules and procedures . 120
10.4.1 Requirement . 120
10.4.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 120
10.5 [OM-01-03] Continuous cybersecurity verification . 121
10.5.1 Requirement . 121
10.5.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 121
10.6 [OM-02-01] Railway application cybersecurity case . 121
10.6.1 Requirement . 121
10.6.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 121
10.7 [OM-03-01] Risk assessment update . 122
10.7.1 Requirement . 122
10.7.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 122
10.8 [OM-04-01] Vulnerability advisories . 123
10.8.1 Requirement . 123
10.8.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 123
10.9 [OM-04-02] Cybersecurity testing and report . 123
10.9.1 Requirement . 123
10.9.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 123
10.10 [OM-04-03] Vulnerability management . 124
10.10.1 Requirement . 124
10.10.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 124
10.11 [OM-05-01] Patch management process . 124
10.11.1 Requirement . 124
10.11.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 125
10.12 [OM-05-02] Patch management supply chain . 125
10.12.1 Requirement . 125
10.12.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 125
10.13 [OM-05-03] End-of-life and end-of-security-support considerations . 126
10.13.1 Requirement . 126
10.13.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 126
10.14 [OM-06-01] Incident management . 126
10.14.1 Requirement . 126
10.14.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 126
10.15 [OM-06-02] Backup and recovery management . 129
10.15.1 Requirement . 129
10.15.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 129
10.16 [OM-07-01] Security monitoring . 130
10.16.1 Requirement . 130
10.16.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 130
10.17 [OM-08-01] Decommissioning management . 131
10.17.1 Requirement . 131
10.17.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 131
Annex A (informative) Handling conduits . 132
oSIST prEN IEC 63452:2025
IEC CDV 63452 ED1 © IEC 2025
A.1 General . 132
A.2 Protection profiles for conduits . 133
Annex B (informative) Handling legacy systems . 135
General . 136
B.1 Basic security risks . 136
B.1.1 A denial of service attacks and vulnerability exploits . 136
B.1.2 Impersonation attack . 136
B.2 Basic process activities . 137
B.2.1 General . 137
B.2.2 Zoning . 137
B.2.3 Defence in depth . 137
B.2.4 Basic risk analysis . 138
B.2.5 (Re-)Commissioning . 138
B.2.6 Site acceptance test (SAT) . 138
B.2.7 Operation . 139
B.2.8 Training of personnel . 139
B.2.9 Asset inventory . 139
B.3 Basic security countermeasures . 139
B.3.1 General . 139
B.3.2 Protect installation . 139
B.3.3 Regular inspection of installation . 140
B.3.4 Network / perimeter protection . 140
B.3.5 Network segmentation / restricted data flow . 140
B.3.6 Monitoring and network management . 140
B.3.7 Network management system . 141
B.3.8 Intrusion detection / SIEM . 141
B.3.9 Virtual private networks (VPN) . 142
B.3.10 Redundant communication. 142
B.3.11 Security gateway . 142
B.3.12 Handling USB connectors . 142
B.3.13 Encryption . 143
B.3.14 Authentication . 143
Annex C (informative) Cybersecurity design principles and system requirements . 144
C.1 Cybersecurity design principles. 144
C.1.1 Introduction . 144
C.1.2 Secure the weakest link . 144
C.1.3 Defence in depth . 145
C.1.4 Fail secure. 148
C.1.5 Grant least privilege . 149
C.1.6 Economise mechanism . 150
C.1.7 Authenticate requests . 152
C.1.8 Control access . 154
C.1.9 Assume secrets not safe . 155
C.1.10 Make security usable . 156
C.1.11 Promote privacy. 158
C.1.12 Audit and monitor . 158
C.1.13 Proportionality principle . 160
C.1.14 Precautionary principle . 161
C.1.15 Continuous protection . 162
oSIST prEN IEC 63452:2025
IEC CDV 63452 ED1 © IEC 2025
C.1.16 Secure metadata . 163
C.1.17 Secure defaults . 164
C.1.18 Trusted components . 165
C.2 Guidelines for implementation in a railway environment . 166
Annex D (informative) Safety and cybersecurity . 202
General . 203
D.1 Differences between safety and cybersecurity . 203
D.2 Security from a safety perspective . 204
D.3 Co-engineering of safety and security . 204
D.4 Quantification of security . 205
D.5 The relationship between safety integrity levels and security levels . 205
D.6 Responsibility for security . 206
Annex E (informative) Risk acceptance methods . 207
E.1 General . 207
E.2 Example 1 . 207
E.2.1 Introduction . 207
E.2.2 Impact assessment . 207
E.2.3 Likelihood assessment . 208
E.2.4 Risk tolerability . 208
E.2.5 Justification . 209
E.3 Example 2 . 209
E.3.1 Introduction . 209
E.3.2 Impact assessment . 209
E.3.3 Likelihood assessment . 210
E.3.4 Risk tolerability . 211
E.3.5 Justification . 211
E.4 Example 3 . 211
E.4.1 Introduction . 211
E.4.2 Impact assessment . 211
E.4.3 Likelihood assessment . 212
E.4.4 Risk tolerability . 213
E.4.5 Justification . 213
E.5 Example 4 . 213
E.5.1 Introduction . 213
E.5.2 Impact Assessment . 213
E.5.3 Likelihood assessment . 214
E.5.4 Risk acceptance . 216
E.5.5 Justification . 216
Annex F (informative) Railway system models and zone models . 218
F.1 Design guidance and rules . 218
F.1.1 Design guidance for system models . 218
F.1.2 Design rules for the area-based model . 218
F.1.3 Design rules for the topology-based model . 219
F.2 Magnifications of the high-level railway zone model . 219
F.2.1 Design Guidance for zone models . 222
F.3 Train to ground communication . 234
F.3.1 Introduction . 234
F.3.2 Communication channel. 234
oSIST prEN IEC 63452:2025
IEC CDV 63452 ED1 © IEC 2025
F.3.3 Principles . 235
Annex G (informative) Cybersecurity deliverables content . 236
G.1 Purpose . 236
G.2 Railway OT cybersecurity policy and cybersecurity programme . 236
G.2.1 Railway OT cybersecurity policy . 236
G.2.2 Railway OT cybersecurity programme . 236
G.2.3 Rational and guidance . 237
G.3 Cybersecurity management plan . 237
G.4 Risk assessment report . 239
G.5 Cybersecurity requirement specification . 239
G.6 Cybersecurity guidelines for the railway solution . 240
G.7 Cybersecurity evaluation plan . 241
G.8 Cybersecurity case . 242
G.9 Cybersecurity maintenance plan . 243
Annex H (informative) Cybersecurity competence profiles . 245
H.1 Purpose . 245
H.2 Railway cybersecurity competence profiles . 246
H.2.1 Introduction . 246
H.2.2 Railway Project Cybersecurity Manager . 246
H.2.3 Railway Cybersecurity Architect . 247
H.2.4 Railway Cybersecurity Risk Analyst . 248
H.2.5 Railway Cybersecurity Implementer . 249
H.2.6 Railway Cybersecurity Penetration Tester . 250
H.2.7 Railway Cybersecurity Assessor . 252
H.2.8 Railway Cybersecurity Verifier . 253
H.2.9 Railway Cybersecurity Validator . 254
H.2.10 Railway Cybersecurity Administrator . 255
H.2.11 Railway Cybersecurity Incident Responder . 256
H.2.12 Railway Chief Information Security Officer . 257
Annex I (informative) Cybersecurity for operation and maintenance activities -
Operational guidance . 260
I.1 Purpose . 260
I.2 Change to maintenance activities and teams . 260
I.3 Access Strategy . 260
I.3.1 Physical Access: . 260
I.3.2 Role-Based Access: . 260
I.3.3 Network Access: . 261
I.3.4 Consistency for Access Protection: . 261
I.4 Remote Access and Maintenance . 261
I.4.1 General . 261
I.4.2 Remote Maintenance OT . 261
I.4.3 Methods of Remote Maintenance . 261
I.5 Other aspects to be correctly addressed . 262
I.5.1 Data Protection: . 262
I.5.2 Decommissioning: . 262
I.5.3 Awareness of People: . 262
I.5.4 Use of Portable Media (such as laptop, USB key): . 262
I.5.5 Key Exchange and Management: . 262
Annex J (informative) Vulnerability Management - Operational guidance . 263
oSIST prEN IEC 63452:2025
IEC CDV 63452 ED1 © IEC 2025
J.1 Purpose . 263
J.2 organizational aspects . 263
J.3 Process scoping . 263
J.4 Vulnerability identification, analysis and prioritization criteria . 264
J.5 Vulnerability remediation . 265
Annex K (informative) Cloud security . 268
K.1 General . 268
K.2 Applicability . 268
K.3 Cloud Security within the railway application life cycle . 269
K.3.1 Specification Phase . 269
K.3.2 Design and Implementation Phase . 270
K.3.3 Validation Phase . 274
K.3.4 Operations and Maintenance Phase . 275
K.3.5 Decommissioning . 278
K.3.6 Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery . 278
K.4 Cross-Refe
...



