Status
Not Published
Publication Date
10-Mar-2027
Current Stage
5020 - Vote circulated - Formal Approval
Start Date
30-Oct-2026
Due Date
31-Dec-2025
Completion Date
30-Oct-2026

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prEN IEC 63452:2025 - BARVE

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FprEN IEC 63452:2026 is a draft IEC/CENELEC standard for railway applications cybersecurity. It defines a consistent way to manage cybersecurity for railway systems, from system description and risk assessment through architecture, assurance, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning. It is written for railway duty holders, asset owners, system integrators, maintenance service providers, and product suppliers working on railway OT environments.

What does FprEN IEC 63452:2026 specify?

FprEN IEC 63452:2026 specifies how to manage cybersecurity in railway applications across the railway system life cycle. The scope covers railway networks, urban transport networks, and magnetic levitated transport systems, including rolling stock, fixed installations, and operational management systems such as supervision, information, communication, signalling, and processing systems.

The document is organized into Clauses 1 to 10, with annexes A to K. Clause 3 defines the terms, taxonomy, and abbreviations used throughout the standard; Clauses 4 to 10 set out the cybersecurity process from system description to decommissioning; the annexes give guidance, examples, and implementation support.

Main structure:

  • Clause 4 - Railway system overview
  • Clause 5 - Enterprise cybersecurity programme and management
  • Clause 6 - Cybersecurity within a railway application life cycle
  • Clause 7 - Risk assessment for system design
  • Clause 8 - Cybersecurity architecture, integration and configuration
  • Clause 9 - Cybersecurity assurance for railway solutions
  • Clause 10 - Operational, maintenance and decommissioning requirements
AnnexWhat it covers
AConduits and protection profiles for conduits
BHandling legacy systems
CCybersecurity design principles and adaptation to the railway environment
DSafety and cybersecurity
ERisk acceptance methods
FGuidance for implementing zone models and train-to-ground communication
GExample contents of key cybersecurity deliverables
HCybersecurity competence profiles
IAccess strategy, remote access, maintenance, data protection, decommissioning, awareness, portable media, and key management
JVulnerability identification, prioritization, and remediation
KCloud security across the railway application life cycle

What are the key requirements of FprEN IEC 63452:2026?

FprEN IEC 63452:2026 builds cybersecurity around a railway-specific system model, an organizational cybersecurity programme, a risk-based design process, and life-cycle assurance. In practice, that means the document is not only about technical controls - it also requires defined roles, documented outputs, and controlled handover between stakeholders.

Clause 4 - describe the railway system before you secure it

FprEN IEC 63452:2026 requires a cybersecurity-oriented description of the railway system, including the railway system, the railway application, and the railway solution. Clause 4 uses system identification, subsystem distribution, and a high-level railway zone model to make the security boundary and interfaces visible.

This matters because the later risk assessment depends on knowing what is inside the scope, what connects to it, and where access points exist. Clause 4 also covers shared cybersecurity services, so organizations can document common services once and reuse them across applications.

Clause 5 - maintain an enterprise OT cybersecurity programme

FprEN IEC 63452:2026 requires an enterprise-level OT cybersecurity management approach that applies before, during, and after any specific project. Clause 5 outputs a railway OT cybersecurity policy, a railway OT cybersecurity programme, and documented processes for information sharing, competency management, inventory management, supply chain management, risk management, business continuity management, and data protection management.

This is important because railway cybersecurity is not treated as a one-off design task. The organization must keep live processes and records, including an up-to-date inventory, a risk register, a threat log, and a risk treatment plan.

Clause 6 - align cybersecurity with the railway application life cycle

FprEN IEC 63452:2026 requires cybersecurity activities to be coordinated with the railway application life cycle described in IEC FDIS 62278-1:2024. Clause 6 explains how cybersecurity tasks and deliverables are synchronized with engineering, safety, RAMS, verification and validation, and test and commissioning activities.

The practical effect is that cybersecurity is planned as part of the project workflow, not added at the end. The standard also separates the railway application life cycle from the product life cycle, while still addressing the interface with suppliers through supply chain management.

Clause 7 - perform zoning and risk assessment before defining security measures

FprEN IEC 63452:2026 uses a risk-based method to derive cybersecurity requirements for the system under consideration (SUC). Clause 7 requires identification of the SUC and its security context, an initial risk assessment, partitioning into zones and conduits, risk comparison, and a detailed risk assessment.

Clause 7 allows three ways to treat identified threats:

  • apply a code of practice
  • use a reference system
  • perform explicit risk evaluation

This matters because the document lets the team select the most suitable method for each zone or conduit, but the selected approach must produce an acceptable residual risk and documented cybersecurity requirements specification (CRS). Clause 7 also requires asset owner approval of the result.

Clause 8 - turn risk results into architecture and configuration

FprEN IEC 63452:2026 requires the SUC cybersecurity functional architecture to be defined, and the resulting cybersecurity requirements to be apportioned to subsystems, zones, and conduits. Clause 8 also requires cybersecurity integration guidelines and cybersecurity parameterization and configuration controls.

In practice, this means the architecture must preserve the essential functions of the railway solution while adding compensating countermeasures where needed. The clause also requires traceability from requirements to architecture and configuration so that changes can be controlled later.

Clause 9 - collect assurance evidence before handover

FprEN IEC 63452:2026 requires cybersecurity verification and validation activities and a structured acceptance process for the railway solution. Clause 9 collects the evidence into the railway solution cybersecurity case, which is delivered to the asset owner for review and acceptance.

This matters because acceptance is based on documented evidence, not only on implementation claims. The cybersecurity case becomes the handover package that supports secure operation after project completion.

Clause 10 - keep cybersecurity active during operation, maintenance, and decommissioning

FprEN IEC 63452:2026 requires a cybersecurity maintenance plan and continuing operational controls. Clause 10 covers continuous cybersecurity verification, updates to the railway application cybersecurity case, vulnerability management, patch management, incident management, security monitoring, and decommissioning management.

The practical point is that security must be maintained after handover, including the handling of vulnerabilities, updates, and end-of-life decisions. Clause 10 places primary responsibility on the railway asset owner, while its processes can affect maintenance service providers, system integrators, and product suppliers.

What terms does FprEN IEC 63452:2026 define?

  • System under consideration (SUC) - the railway solution or system part being assessed and secured within the standard’s risk and architecture process.
  • Cybersecurity requirements specification (CRS) - the document that captures the cybersecurity requirements derived from the risk assessment and used for design, verification, and acceptance.
  • Security-related application conditions (SecRACs) - security conditions that must be met in operation and maintenance so the railway solution remains acceptably secure.
  • Operational Technology (OT) - the operational systems and environments used to control and monitor railway functions, as distinct from general IT.
  • Asset owner (AO) - the organization responsible for the railway application during operation and for accepting the cybersecurity case.
  • Defence in depth - a cybersecurity approach that uses several independent protective layers so that one failed layer does not expose the system.
  • Zone and conduit - the partitioning concept used to separate railway assets into security zones and the controlled links between them.

Who uses FprEN IEC 63452:2026?

FprEN IEC 63452:2026 is used by railway duty holders, asset owners, system integrators, maintenance service providers, and product suppliers. It is relevant to railway networks, urban rail transport, and magnetic levitated transport systems, especially where OT cybersecurity affects operation and safety-related interfaces.

Typical tasks include:

  • defining the SUC and its security context
  • performing risk assessments and choosing mitigation methods
  • designing zones, conduits, and cybersecurity architecture
  • preparing the CRS, cybersecurity case, and maintenance plan
  • verifying, validating, and accepting the railway solution
  • managing vulnerabilities, patches, incidents, and decommissioning

Annex H is especially relevant for teams building staffing and competence plans, because it describes cybersecurity roles such as project cybersecurity manager, architect, risk analyst, implementer, penetration tester, assessor, verifier, validator, administrator, incident responder, and chief information security officer.

What changed in FprEN IEC 63452:2026 from the previous edition?

This document supersedes 9/3000/CD and 9/3036A/CC. The cover note states that the voting closing date was extended to 2025-10-17 and that no technical modification was made.

Which standards are used with FprEN IEC 63452:2026?

FprEN IEC 63452:2026 lists no normative references, but it clearly builds on several related standards and frameworks.

  • IEC FDIS 62278-1:2024 - provides the generic RAMS life cycle used to synchronize cybersecurity activities with railway engineering.
  • IEC 62443-3-2:2020 - the basis for the document’s railway risk assessment process.
  • IEC 62443-4-1:2018 - referenced for product secure development life cycle practices.
  • IEC 62443-4-2:2019/COR1:2022 - used in the taxonomy and in security requirement mapping for components.
  • IEC 62443-3-3:2013/COR1:2014 - the source for foundational cybersecurity requirements adapted in Annex C.
  • IEC 62443-2-1:2024 and IEC 62443-2-4:2023 - referenced in annexes and supporting discussion on cybersecurity management and network concepts.
  • NIST SP 800-218, NIST SP 800-82, and NIST SP 800-160 Vol1 - named as additional references that product suppliers may use.

What does the FprEN IEC 63452:2026 document contain?

The document contains flowcharts, structured requirement clauses, and annexed implementation guidance rather than a single list of technical settings. Its main figures show the railway system taxonomy, segregation between IT and OT, example area-based and topology-based models, the high-level zone model, the cybersecurity management system, the IEC 62278-1 V-cycle, and the zoning and risk assessment process.

It also includes Table 4, which maps cybersecurity activities to life-cycle phases and deliverables, and Annex C’s table of adapted cybersecurity requirements for the railway environment. Annex E provides worked examples of risk acceptance methods, including matrices and calculation approaches, while Annex F gives example zone-model representations and train-to-ground communication guidance.

Annex G gives example contents for deliverables such as the cybersecurity management plan, risk assessment report, CRS, evaluation plan, cybersecurity case, and maintenance plan. Annexes I, J, and K extend the document into maintenance operations, vulnerability remediation, and cloud security across the railway life cycle.

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Effective Date
13-Oct-2026
Effective Date
05-Aug-2025

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Frequently Asked Questions

FprEN IEC 63452:2026 is a draft published by CLC. Its full title is "Railway applications - Cybersecurity". This standard covers: Railway applications - Cybersecurity

Railway applications - Cybersecurity

FprEN IEC 63452:2026 has the following relationships with other standards: It is inter standard links to EN 50159:2026, CLC/TS 50701:2023. Understanding these relationships helps ensure you are using the most current and applicable version of the standard.

FprEN IEC 63452:2026 is available in PDF format for immediate download after purchase. The document can be added to your cart and obtained through the secure checkout process. Digital delivery ensures instant access to the complete standard document.

Standards Content (Sample)


SLOVENSKI STANDARD
01-september-2025
Železniške naprave - Kibernetska varnost
Railway applications - Cybersecurity
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: prEN IEC 63452:2025
ICS:
35.030 Informacijska varnost IT Security
45.020 Železniška tehnika na Railway engineering in
splošno general
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.

9/3232A/CDV
COMMITTEE DRAFT FOR VOTE (CDV)
PROJECT NUMBER:
IEC 63452 ED1
DATE OF CIRCULATION: CLOSING DATE FOR VOTING:
2025-08-08 (2025-07-18) 2025-10-17 (2025-10-10)
SUPERSEDES DOCUMENTS:
9/3000/CD, 9/3036A/CC
IEC TC 9 : ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS FOR RAILWAYS
SECRETARIAT: SECRETARY:
France Mr Denis MIGLIANICO
OF INTEREST TO THE FOLLOWING COMMITTEES: HORIZONTAL FUNCTION(S):
TC 65
ASPECTS CONCERNED:
Information security and data privacy
SUBMITTED FOR CENELEC PARALLEL VOTING NOT SUBMITTED FOR CENELEC PARALLEL VOTING
Attention IEC-CENELEC parallel voting
The attention of IEC National Committees, members of CENELEC, is
drawn to the fact that this Committee Draft for Vote (CDV) is submitted
for parallel voting.
The CENELEC members are invited to vote through the CENELEC
online voting system.
This document is still under study and subject to change. It should not be used for reference purposes.
Recipients of this document are invited to submit, with their comments, notification of any relevant patent rights of which they are
aware and to provide supporting documentation.
Recipients of this document are invited to submit, with their comments, notification of any relevant “In Some Countries” clauses to
be included should this proposal proceed. Recipients are reminded that the CDV stage is the final stage for submitting ISC clauses.
(SEE AC/22/2007 OR NEW GUIDANCE DOC).
TITLE:
Railway applications – Cybersecurity
PROPOSED STABILITY DATE: 2028
NOTE FROM TC/SC OFFICERS:
This A version shows aligned Word extraction from the OSD in regards of annexes and figures. The closing date for
voting has been extended to 2025-10-17. No technical modification has been made.
st
The Cenelec parallel vote status of this project has been changed on 1 of August, as reflected on this coverpage.
electronic file, to make a copy and to print out the content for the sole purpose of preparing National Committee positions.
You may not copy or "mirror" the file or printed version of the document, or any part of it, for any other purpose without
permission in writing from IEC.

Link to Committee Draft for Vote (CDV) online document:

https://osd.iec.ch/#/editor/archive/0e847a8f-d663-e6d5-e063-1710000a30d0/en/CCDV/1

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IEC CDV 63452 ED1 © IEC 2025
CONTENTS
CONTENTS . 1
FOREWORD . 13
Introduction. 15
Purpose . 15
Overview of the structure of this document . 15
1 Scope . 17
2 Normative references . 17
3 Terms and definitions, abbreviated terms and acronyms, taxonomy and terms
equivalence . 17
3.1 Terms and definitions. 17
3.2 Abbreviated terms and acronyms . 46
3.3 Railway system taxonomy and terms equivalence . 50
4 Railway system overview . 53
4.1 Purpose . 53
4.2 Overview . 53
4.3 Inputs / Outputs . 54
4.4 [SO-01-01] Identification of the railway system . 54
4.4.1 Requirement . 54
4.4.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 54
4.5 [SO-02-01] Definition of a high-level railway system model . 56
4.5.1 Requirement . 56
4.5.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 56
4.6 [SO-03-01] Definition of a high-level railway zone model . 58
4.6.1 Requirement . 58
4.6.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 58
4.7 [SO-04-01] Specification of shared cybersecurity services . 60
4.7.1 Requirement . 60
4.7.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 60
5 Enterprise cybersecurity programme and management . 62
5.1 Overview . 62
5.2 Inputs / Outputs . 62
5.3 [CP-01-01] Railway OT cybersecurity policy . 63
5.3.1 Requirement . 63
5.3.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 63
5.4 [CP-01-02] Railway OT cybersecurity programme . 63
5.4.1 Requirement . 63
5.4.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 64
5.5 [CP-02-01] Information sharing management . 65
5.5.1 Requirement . 65
5.5.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 65
5.6 [CP-03-01] Competency management . 65
5.6.1 Requirement . 65
5.6.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 66
5.7 [CP-04-01] Inventory management . 66
5.7.1 Requirement . 66
5.7.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 67
IEC CDV 63452 ED1 © IEC 2025
5.8 [CP-05-01] Supply chain management . 67
5.8.1 Requirement . 67
5.8.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 67
5.9 [CP-06-01] Risk management . 70
5.9.1 Requirement . 70
5.9.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 71
5.10 [CP-07-01] Business continuity management . 71
5.10.1 Requirement . 71
5.10.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 72
5.11 [CP-08-01] Data protection management . 72
5.11.1 Requirement . 72
5.11.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 73
6 Cybersecurity within a railway application life cycle . 74
6.1 Purpose . 74
6.2 Railway application and product life cycles . 74
6.3 Manage cybersecurity activities and interfaces . 74
6.3.1 Inputs / Outputs . 74
6.3.2 [LC-01-01] Assign Project Cybersecurity Manager . 74
6.3.3 [LC-02-01] Plan project cybersecurity activities till the handover . 75
6.3.4 [LC-02-02] Tailoring the cybersecurity management plan . 76
6.3.5 [LC-02-03] Cybersecurity management plan approval . 76
6.3.6 [LC-02-04] Management of security issues before handover . 77
6.3.7 [LC-03-01] Manage product suppliers . 77
6.3.8 [LC-04-01] Manage interaction with safety and RAM teams . 77
6.4 Cybersecurity activities mapping to the IEC 62278-1 life cycle . 78
7 Risk assessment for system design . 83
7.1 Purpose and outcome . 83
7.2 Overview . 83
7.3 Identify the SUC and its security context . 86
7.3.1 Description . 86
7.3.2 Inputs / Outputs . 86
7.3.3 [ZR-01-01] Identify the SUC, its security perimeter and access points . 86
7.3.4 [ZR-01-02] Identify the cybersecurity context . 87
7.4 Initial Risk Assessment . 89
7.4.1 Description . 89
7.4.2 Inputs / Outputs . 89
7.4.3 [ZR-02-01] Initial risk assessment . 89
7.5 Partitioning of the SUC in zones and conduits . 90
7.5.1 Description . 90
7.5.2 Inputs / Outputs . 90
7.5.3 [ZR-03-01] Partitioning of the SUC . 90
7.6 Risk comparison . 91
7.6.1 Description . 91
7.6.2 Inputs / Outputs . 91
7.6.3 [ZR-04-01] Compare initial risk with tolerable risk . 91
7.7 Detailed Risk Assessment . 92
7.7.1 Description . 92
7.7.2 Inputs / Outputs . 92
7.7.3 [ZR-05-01] Perform Detailed Risk Assessment . 92
IEC CDV 63452 ED1 © IEC 2025
7.7.4 [ZR-05-02] Identify threats . 93
7.7.5 [ZR-05-03] Identify vulnerabilities . 94
7.7.6 [ZR-05-04] Manage identified threats and vulnerabilities . 95
7.7.7 [ZR-05-05] Apply a code of practice . 95
7.7.8 [ZR-05-06] Application requirements from a reference system . 95
7.7.9 Explicit Risk Evaluation [ZR-05-07, ZR-05-08, ZR-05-09] . 96
7.7.10 [ZR-05-10] Threats coverage and risk acceptance . 100
7.7.11 [ZR-05-11] Document results of the Detailed Risk Assessment . 100
7.8 Document cyber security requirements . 101
7.8.1 Description . 101
7.8.2 Inputs / Outputs . 101
7.8.3 [ZR-06-01] Cybersecurity requirements specification . 101
7.9 Asset owner's approval . 103
7.9.1 Description . 103
7.9.2 Inputs / Outputs . 103
7.9.3 [ZR-07-01] Asset owner's approval . 103
8 Cybersecurity architecture, integration and configuration . 103
8.1 Purpose . 103
8.2 Inputs / Outputs . 103
8.3 SUC cybersecurity functional architecture . 104
8.3.1 [AA-01-01] Cybersecurity Architecture . 104
8.3.2 [AA-01-02] Cybersecurity shall not adversely impact essential functions . 104
8.3.3 [AA-01-03] Requirements apportionment to subsystems . 105
8.3.4 [AA-01-04] Inclusion of compensating countermeasures . 106
8.3.5 [AA-01-05] Cybersecurity requirement traceability . 106
8.4 Cybersecurity integration . 106
8.4.1 [AA-02-01] Cybersecurity guidelines for the railway solution . 106
8.5 Cybersecurity configuration . 107
8.5.1 [AA-03-01] Cybersecurity parameterization and configuration of the
railway solution . 107
9 Cybersecurity assurance for railway solutions . 107
9.1 Purpose . 107
9.2 Overview . 108
9.3 Cybersecurity verification and validation . 109
9.3.1 Description . 109
9.3.2 Inputs / Outputs . 109
9.3.3 [CA-01-01] Plan cybersecurity evaluation activities . 110
9.3.4 [CA-01-02] Independence of security testers . 111
9.3.5 [CA-01-03] Execution of cybersecurity evaluation activities. 111
9.3.6 [CA-01-04] Verification of cybersecurity deliverables . 112
9.3.7 [CA-01-05] Cybersecurity validation of the railway solution . 112
9.3.8 [CA-01-06] Railway solution cybersecurity case . 113
9.4 Railway solution acceptance . 114
9.4.1 Description . 114
9.4.2 Inputs / Outputs . 114
9.4.3 [CA-02-01] Establish cybersecurity handover plan . 115
9.4.4 [CA-02-02] Approval of the cybersecurity handover plan . 115
9.4.5 [CA-02-03] Approval of the cybersecurity case . 116
9.4.6 [CA-02-04] Perform cybersecurity handover. 116
IEC CDV 63452 ED1 © IEC 2025
10 Operational, maintenance and decommissioning requirements . 116
10.1 Overview . 116
10.2 Inputs / Outputs . 118
10.3 [OM-01-01] Cybersecurity maintenance plan . 119
10.3.1 Requirement . 119
10.3.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 119
10.4 [OM-01-02] Cybersecurity rules and procedures . 120
10.4.1 Requirement . 120
10.4.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 120
10.5 [OM-01-03] Continuous cybersecurity verification . 121
10.5.1 Requirement . 121
10.5.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 121
10.6 [OM-02-01] Railway application cybersecurity case . 121
10.6.1 Requirement . 121
10.6.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 121
10.7 [OM-03-01] Risk assessment update . 122
10.7.1 Requirement . 122
10.7.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 122
10.8 [OM-04-01] Vulnerability advisories . 123
10.8.1 Requirement . 123
10.8.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 123
10.9 [OM-04-02] Cybersecurity testing and report . 123
10.9.1 Requirement . 123
10.9.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 123
10.10 [OM-04-03] Vulnerability management . 124
10.10.1 Requirement . 124
10.10.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 124
10.11 [OM-05-01] Patch management process . 124
10.11.1 Requirement . 124
10.11.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 125
10.12 [OM-05-02] Patch management supply chain . 125
10.12.1 Requirement . 125
10.12.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 125
10.13 [OM-05-03] End-of-life and end-of-security-support considerations . 126
10.13.1 Requirement . 126
10.13.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 126
10.14 [OM-06-01] Incident management . 126
10.14.1 Requirement . 126
10.14.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 126
10.15 [OM-06-02] Backup and recovery management . 129
10.15.1 Requirement . 129
10.15.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 129
10.16 [OM-07-01] Security monitoring . 130
10.16.1 Requirement . 130
10.16.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 130
10.17 [OM-08-01] Decommissioning management . 131
10.17.1 Requirement . 131
10.17.2 Rationale and supplemental guidance . 131
Annex A (informative) Handling conduits . 132
IEC CDV 63452 ED1 © IEC 2025
A.1 General . 132
A.2 Protection profiles for conduits . 133
Annex B (informative) Handling legacy systems . 135
General . 136
B.1 Basic security risks . 136
B.1.1 A denial of service attacks and vulnerability exploits . 136
B.1.2 Impersonation attack . 136
B.2 Basic process activities . 137
B.2.1 General . 137
B.2.2 Zoning . 137
B.2.3 Defence in depth . 137
B.2.4 Basic risk analysis . 138
B.2.5 (Re-)Commissioning . 138
B.2.6 Site acceptance test (SAT) . 138
B.2.7 Operation . 139
B.2.8 Training of personnel . 139
B.2.9 Asset inventory . 139
B.3 Basic security countermeasures . 139
B.3.1 General . 139
B.3.2 Protect installation . 139
B.3.3 Regular inspection of installation . 140
B.3.4 Network / perimeter protection . 140
B.3.5 Network segmentation / restricted data flow . 140
B.3.6 Monitoring and network management . 140
B.3.7 Network management system . 141
B.3.8 Intrusion detection / SIEM . 141
B.3.9 Virtual private networks (VPN) . 142
B.3.10 Redundant communication. 142
B.3.11 Security gateway . 142
B.3.12 Handling USB connectors . 142
B.3.13 Encryption . 143
B.3.14 Authentication . 143
Annex C (informative) Cybersecurity design principles and system requirements . 144
C.1 Cybersecurity design principles. 144
C.1.1 Introduction . 144
C.1.2 Secure the weakest link . 144
C.1.3 Defence in depth . 145
C.1.4 Fail secure. 148
C.1.5 Grant least privilege . 149
C.1.6 Economise mechanism . 150
C.1.7 Authenticate requests . 152
C.1.8 Control access . 154
C.1.9 Assume secrets not safe . 155
C.1.10 Make security usable . 156
C.1.11 Promote privacy. 158
C.1.12 Audit and monitor . 158
C.1.13 Proportionality principle . 160
C.1.14 Precautionary principle . 161
C.1.15 Continuous protection . 162
IEC CDV 63452 ED1 © IEC 2025
C.1.16 Secure metadata . 163
C.1.17 Secure defaults . 164
C.1.18 Trusted components . 165
C.2 Guidelines for implementation in a railway environment . 166
Annex D (informative) Safety and cybersecurity . 202
General . 203
D.1 Differences between safety and cybersecurity . 203
D.2 Security from a safety perspective . 204
D.3 Co-engineering of safety and security . 204
D.4 Quantification of security . 205
D.5 The relationship between safety integrity levels and security levels . 205
D.6 Responsibility for security . 206
Annex E (informative) Risk acceptance methods . 207
E.1 General . 207
E.2 Example 1 . 207
E.2.1 Introduction . 207
E.2.2 Impact assessment . 207
E.2.3 Likelihood assessment . 208
E.2.4 Risk tolerability . 208
E.2.5 Justification . 209
E.3 Example 2 . 209
E.3.1 Introduction . 209
E.3.2 Impact assessment . 209
E.3.3 Likelihood assessment . 210
E.3.4 Risk tolerability . 211
E.3.5 Justification . 211
E.4 Example 3 . 211
E.4.1 Introduction . 211
E.4.2 Impact assessment . 211
E.4.3 Likelihood assessment . 212
E.4.4 Risk tolerability . 213
E.4.5 Justification . 213
E.5 Example 4 . 213
E.5.1 Introduction . 213
E.5.2 Impact Assessment . 213
E.5.3 Likelihood assessment . 214
E.5.4 Risk acceptance . 216
E.5.5 Justification . 216
Annex F (informative) Railway system models and zone models . 218
F.1 Design guidance and rules . 218
F.1.1 Design guidance for system models . 218
F.1.2 Design rules for the area-based model . 218
F.1.3 Design rules for the topology-based model . 219
F.2 Magnifications of the high-level railway zone model . 219
F.2.1 Design Guidance for zone models . 222
F.3 Train to ground communication . 234
F.3.1 Introduction . 234
F.3.2 Communication channel. 234
IEC CDV 63452 ED1 © IEC 2025
F.3.3 Principles . 235
Annex G (informative) Cybersecurity deliverables content . 236
G.1 Purpose . 236
G.2 Railway OT cybersecurity policy and cybersecurity programme . 236
G.2.1 Railway OT cybersecurity policy . 236
G.2.2 Railway OT cybersecurity programme . 236
G.2.3 Rational and guidance . 237
G.3 Cybersecurity management plan . 237
G.4 Risk assessment report . 239
G.5 Cybersecurity requirement specification . 239
G.6 Cybersecurity guidelines for the railway solution . 240
G.7 Cybersecurity evaluation plan . 241
G.8 Cybersecurity case . 242
G.9 Cybersecurity maintenance plan . 243
Annex H (informative) Cybersecurity competence profiles . 245
H.1 Purpose . 245
H.2 Railway cybersecurity competence profiles . 246
H.2.1 Introduction . 246
H.2.2 Railway Project Cybersecurity Manager . 246
H.2.3 Railway Cybersecurity Architect . 247
H.2.4 Railway Cybersecurity Risk Analyst . 248
H.2.5 Railway Cybersecurity Implementer . 249
H.2.6 Railway Cybersecurity Penetration Tester . 250
H.2.7 Railway Cybersecurity Assessor . 252
H.2.8 Railway Cybersecurity Verifier . 253
H.2.9 Railway Cybersecurity Validator . 254
H.2.10 Railway Cybersecurity Administrator . 255
H.2.11 Railway Cybersecurity Incident Responder . 256
H.2.12 Railway Chief Information Security Officer . 257
Annex I (informative) Cybersecurity for operation and maintenance activities -
Operational guidance . 260
I.1 Purpose . 260
I.2 Change to maintenance activities and teams . 260
I.3 Access Strategy . 260
I.3.1 Physical Access: . 260
I.3.2 Role-Based Access: . 260
I.3.3 Network Access: . 261
I.3.4 Consistency for Access Protection: . 261
I.4 Remote Access and Maintenance . 261
I.4.1 General . 261
I.4.2 Remote Maintenance OT . 261
I.4.3 Methods of Remote Maintenance . 261
I.5 Other aspects to be correctly addressed . 262
I.5.1 Data Protection: . 262
I.5.2 Decommissioning: . 262
I.5.3 Awareness of People: . 262
I.5.4 Use of Portable Media (such as laptop, USB key): . 262
I.5.5 Key Exchange and Management: . 262
Annex J (informative) Vulnerability Management - Operational guidance . 263
IEC CDV 63452 ED1 © IEC 2025
J.1 Purpose . 263
J.2 organizational aspects . 263
J.3 Process scoping . 263
J.4 Vulnerability identification, analysis and prioritization criteria . 264
J.5 Vulnerability remediation . 265
Annex K (informative) Cloud security . 268
K.1 General . 268
K.2 Applicability . 268
K.3 Cloud Security within the railway application life cycle . 269
K.3.1 Specification Phase . 269
K.3.2 Design and Implementation Phase . 270
K.3.3 Validation Phase . 274
K.3.4 Operations and Maintenance Phase . 275
K.3.5 Decommissioning . 278
K.3.6 Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery . 278
K.4 Cross-Refe
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