ASTM G145-08(2023)
(Guide)Standard Guide for Studying Fire Incidents in Oxygen Systems
Standard Guide for Studying Fire Incidents in Oxygen Systems
SIGNIFICANCE AND USE
5.1 This guide helps those studying oxygen system incidents to select a direct cause hypothesis and to avoid conclusions based on hypotheses, however plausible, that have proven faulty in the past.
SCOPE
1.1 This guide covers procedures and material for examining fires in oxygen systems for the purposes of identifying potential causes and preventing recurrence.
1.2 This guide is not comprehensive. The analysis of oxygen fire incidents is not a science, and definitive causes have not been established for some events.
1.3 The procedures and analyses in this guide have been found to be useful for interpreting fire events, for helping identify potential causes, and for excluding other potential causes. The inclusion or omission of any analytical strategy is not intended to suggest either applicability or inapplicability of that method in any actual incident study.
Note 1: Although this guide has been found applicable for assisting qualified technical personnel to analyze incidents, each incident is unique and must be approached as a unique event. Therefore, the selection of specific tactics and the sequence of application of those tactics must be conscious decisions of those studying the event.
Note 2: The incident may require the formation of a team to provide the necessary expertise and experience to conduct the study. The personnel analyzing an incident, or at least one member of the team, should know the process under study and the equipment installation.
1.4 Warning—During combustion, gases, vapors, aerosols, fumes, or combinations thereof, are evolved, which may be present and may be hazardous to people. Caution—Adequate precautions should be taken to protect those conducting a study.
1.5 This standard does not purport to address all of the safety concerns, if any, associated with its use. It is the responsibility of the user of this standard to establish appropriate safety, health, and environmental practices and determine the applicability of regulatory limitations prior to use.
1.6 This international standard was developed in accordance with internationally recognized principles on standardization established in the Decision on Principles for the Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations issued by the World Trade Organization Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee.
General Information
Relations
Standards Content (Sample)
This international standard was developed in accordance with internationally recognized principles on standardization established in the Decision on Principles for the
Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations issued by the World Trade Organization Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee.
Designation: G145 − 08 (Reapproved 2023)
Standard Guide for
Studying Fire Incidents in Oxygen Systems
This standard is issued under the fixed designation G145; the number immediately following the designation indicates the year of
original adoption or, in the case of revision, the year of last revision. A number in parentheses indicates the year of last reapproval. A
superscript epsilon (´) indicates an editorial change since the last revision or reapproval.
1. Scope mendations issued by the World Trade Organization Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee.
1.1 This guide covers procedures and material for examin-
ing fires in oxygen systems for the purposes of identifying
2. Referenced Documents
potential causes and preventing recurrence.
2.1 ASTM Standards:
1.2 This guide is not comprehensive. The analysis of oxy-
E620 Practice for Reporting Opinions of Scientific or Tech-
gen fire incidents is not a science, and definitive causes have
nical Experts
not been established for some events.
E678 Practice for Evaluation of Scientific or Technical Data
1.3 The procedures and analyses in this guide have been
(Withdrawn 2022)
found to be useful for interpreting fire events, for helping
E860 Practice for Examining and Preparing Items That Are
identify potential causes, and for excluding other potential
or May Become Involved in Criminal or Civil Litigation
causes. The inclusion or omission of any analytical strategy is
E1020 Practice for Reporting Incidents that May Involve
not intended to suggest either applicability or inapplicability of
Criminal or Civil Litigation (Withdrawn 2022)
that method in any actual incident study.
E1138 Terminology for Technical Aspects of Products Li-
ability Litigation (Withdrawn 1995)
NOTE 1—Although this guide has been found applicable for assisting
E1188 Practice for Collection and Preservation of Informa-
qualified technical personnel to analyze incidents, each incident is unique
tion and Physical Items by a Technical Investigator
and must be approached as a unique event. Therefore, the selection of
specific tactics and the sequence of application of those tactics must be
E1459 Guide for Physical Evidence Labeling and Related
conscious decisions of those studying the event.
Documentation
NOTE 2—The incident may require the formation of a team to provide
E1492 Practice for Receiving, Documenting, Storing, and
the necessary expertise and experience to conduct the study. The personnel
Retrieving Evidence in a Forensic Science Laboratory
analyzing an incident, or at least one member of the team, should know the
G63 Guide for Evaluating Nonmetallic Materials for Oxy-
process under study and the equipment installation.
gen Service
1.4 Warning—During combustion, gases, vapors, aerosols,
G88 Guide for Designing Systems for Oxygen Service
fumes, or combinations thereof, are evolved, which may be
G93 Guide for Cleanliness Levels and Cleaning Methods for
present and may be hazardous to people. Caution—Adequate
Materials and Equipment Used in Oxygen-Enriched En-
precautions should be taken to protect those conducting a
vironments
study.
G94 Guide for Evaluating Metals for Oxygen Service
1.5 This standard does not purport to address all of the
G114 Practices for Evaluating the Age Resistance of Poly-
safety concerns, if any, associated with its use. It is the
meric Materials Used in Oxygen Service
responsibility of the user of this standard to establish appro-
G124 Test Method for Determining the Combustion Behav-
priate safety, health, and environmental practices and deter-
ior of Metallic Materials in Oxygen-Enriched Atmo-
mine the applicability of regulatory limitations prior to use.
spheres
1.6 This international standard was developed in accor-
G126 Terminology Relating to the Compatibility and Sensi-
dance with internationally recognized principles on standard-
tivity of Materials in Oxygen Enriched Atmospheres
ization established in the Decision on Principles for the
G128 Guide for Control of Hazards and Risks in Oxygen
Development of International Standards, Guides and Recom-
Enriched Systems
1 2
This guide is under the jurisdiction of ASTM Committee G04 on Compatibility For referenced ASTM standards, visit the ASTM website, www.astm.org, or
and Sensitivity of Materials in Oxygen Enriched Atmospheres and is the direct contact ASTM Customer Service at service@astm.org. For Annual Book of ASTM
responsibility of Subcommittee G04.02 on Recommended Practices. Standards volume information, refer to the standard’s Document Summary page on
Current edition approved July 1, 2023. Published July 2023. Originally approved the ASTM website.
in 1996. Last previous edition approved in 2016 as G145 – 08 (2016). DOI: The last approved version of this historical standard is referenced on
10.1520/G0145-08R23. www.astm.org.
Copyright © ASTM International, 100 Barr Harbor Drive, PO Box C700, West Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959. United States
G145 − 08 (2023)
2.2 Compressed Gas Association (CGA) Standards: Discussion—Contamination and cleanliness are opposing
G-4.4 Industrial Practices for Gaseous Oxygen Transmission properties: increasing cleanliness implies decreasing contami-
and Distribution Piping Systems nation.
G-4.8 Safe Use of Aluminum Structured Packing for Oxy-
4. Summary of Guide
gen Distillation
4.1 Following a fire incident in an oxygen-enriched
2.3 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard:
atmosphere, the equipment, operating procedures, and area are
NFPA 53 Fire Hazards in Oxygen Enriched Atmospheres
considered in light of other incidents, potential contributing
NFPA 921 Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations
factors, suggested analytical strategies, and demonstrated labo-
2.4 Occupational Safety and Health Act:
ratory results. The goal is to determine direct cause(s) of the
OSHA Process Safety Management Compliance Manual
incident in order to prevent a recurrence.
2.5 ASTM Adjuncts:
Video: Oxygen Safety 5. Significance and Use
5.1 This guide helps those studying oxygen system inci-
3. Terminology
dents to select a direct cause hypothesis and to avoid conclu-
3.1 Definitions—See Guides G63, G94, and G128 for the sions based on hypotheses, however plausible, that have
terms listed in this section.
proven faulty in the past.
3.1.1 oxygen compatibility, (also oxidant compatibility),
6. Abstract
n—the ability of a substance to coexist with both oxygen and
a potential source(s) of ignition at an expected pressure and
6.1 A series of possible causes and common scenarios are
temperature with a magnitude of risk acceptable to the user.
described to assist those seeking to understand incidents in
oxygen-enriched atmospheres. Many easily misinterpreted fac-
3.1.2 qualified technical personnel, n—persons such as
tors are described to help avoid faulty conclusions. Several
engineers and chemists who, by virtue of education, training,
suspected but unproven incident scenarios are described. Select
or experience, know how to apply the physical and chemical
laboratory data are presented to support assertions about direct
principles involved in the reactions between oxygen and other
causes of incidents.
materials.
3.1.3 oxygen-enriched, adj—a fluid (gas or liquid) mixture
7. Direct-Cause Analysis
containing more than 25 mole % oxygen.
7.1 In this guide, the direct cause of an incident is the
3.2 Definitions of Terms Specific to This Standard:
mechanical or thermodynamic event (such as breakage of a
3.2.1 incident, n—an ignition or fire, or both, that is both
component or near-adiabatic compression), the physicochemi-
undesired and unanticipated, or an undesired and unanticipated
cal property (such as heat of combustion), the procedure (such
consequence of an ignition or fire that was anticipated.
as a valve opening rate), or any departure(s) from the intended
3.2.2 direct incident cause, n—the mechanical or thermody-
state of any of these items, that leads directly to ignition or fire,
namic event (such as breakage of a component or near-
or both. A fire might also be the result of a financial decision,
adiabatic compression), the physicochemical property (such as
worker skill, or manufacturing process—all of which can be
heat of combustion), the procedure (such as a valve opening
viewed as causes—but such factors are addressed more prop-
rate), or any departure(s) from the intended state of any of
erly in a system hazard review. It is noteworthy that some fires
these items, that leads directly to ignition or fire, or both.
are anticipated and the risks (whether human or economic) are
addressed by such things as shielding (for example, to control
3.2.3 fractional evaporation, n—the continuous evaporation
human risk) or acceptance (for example, to address economic
of a quantity of liquid that results in a progressive increase in
risk). In these cases, a fire is not an “incident” unless some
the concentration of a less-volatile constituent(s).
aspect of the event exceeded expectations the initial parameters
3.2.4 Contaminant, n—unwanted molecular or particulate
(for example, the shielding did not provide the expected
matter that could adversely affect or degrade the operation, life,
containment, or the cost exceeded projections). This guide
or reliability of the systems or components upon which it
seeks to identify the material choice, equipment design, assem-
resides.
bly procedure, or other factor that led directly to the fire—and
3.2.5 Contamination, n—(1) the amount of unwanted mo-
more specifically, to distinguish the physical object or action
lecular non-volatile residue (NVR) or particulate matter in a
that caused the fire to start, to continue, or to be injurious or
system; (2) the process or condition of being contaminated.
destructive. Remedial actions are found in other documents
such as Guides G63, G88, and G94, and Practice G93, as well
as NFPA 53, CGA G-4.4, and G-4.8, OSHA Process Safety
Available from Compressed Gas Association (CGA), 4221 Walney Rd., 5th
Management Compliance Manual, and others.
Floor, Chantilly, VA 20151-2923, http://www.cganet.com.
7.2 Example—The direct cause of an incident may be
Available from National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), 1 Batterymarch
Park, Quincy, MA 02169-7471, http://www.nfpa.org.
concluded to be the use of an incompatible material, for
Available from Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 200
example, a polyacetyl component was installed when a mate-
Constitution Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20210, http://www.osha.gov.
rial such as PTFE (polytetrafluoroethylene) or CTFE (chloro-
Available from ASTM Customer Service, 100 Barr Harbor Drive, West
Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959. Request Adjunct ADJG0088. trifluoroethylene) was preferred. The direct cause was not that
G145 − 08 (2023)
the budget was inadequate to cover the cost of PTFE; nor that Prevention can focus on cleanliness. Initiating Event: ignition
specific frictional properties of polyacetyl were required for of an incompatible oil. Direct Cause: contamination of the
mechanical purposes; nor that an incorrect part was installed in system.
error. Note that in this example, PTFE and CTFE might be
8.4.1.2 Example 2—Records may show that a component
needed to prevent or cope with ignition and fire, but that they
broke and produced a rub in a piece of machinery just before
might introduce non-fire-related issues such as loss of me-
an incident. This factor alone can ignite a fire and could be
chanical strength or production of toxic decomposition prod-
identified as the direct cause. If the component broke because
ucts when exposed to heat of compression. it contained a flaw, the flaw might be determined to be the
direct cause. However, if the part was selected because it
8. Elements of a Study offered economy, then the direct cause is still the inadequate
part—not a misguided effort to economize. Prevention in this
8.1 Overview—The study of an oxygen incident typically
case can focus on component quality. Initiating Event: friction
begins (preferably promptly) after the event has concluded.
during the rub. Direct Cause: Mechanical failure.
The fire is extinguished and any safety requirements or
8.4.1.3 Example 3—Deviation from an important operating
immediate needs are addressed (treating injuries, returning
practice, such as first equalizing downstream pressure with a
systems to a safe state, and so forth). Then the investigator can
bypass valve before opening a quick-opening valve, may be
begin to document the event, to preserve the artifacts, and to
established as the direct cause of a fire. The reasons for
detect how they may have been altered or compromised by the
departing from mandated practice are important, but they are
event and follow-up activities. Although many of these steps
not the direct cause. Here, prevention can focus on following
are itemized here, the intent of this guide is not to specify how
standard operating procedures. Initiating Event: approximately
or in what order they should be conducted. Rather, information
adiabatic compression. Direct Cause: incorrect operation.
is offered about certain procedures that have been effective in
8.4.2 An incident might be understood adequately when a
the past, as well as some that have led to faulty conclusions.
conservative tactic has been identified that would have pre-
Typically, good scientific and laboratory skills are useful and
vented or safely managed the event.
adequate. Forensic skills and procedures can be helpful in
8.4.2.1 Example 1—If an item of machinery cannot employ
many cases, but may not be practical in all. For example, the
oxygen-compatible materials because they compromise its
forensic Guide E1459 can assist with managing post-incident
operating economy, and it becomes the site of a fire and injures
artifacts, and related Practices E1492, E620, E678, E860,
someone, then the event may be understood adequately (re-
E1020, and E1188, as well as Terminology E1138, may have
garding preventing recurrence of injury rather than fire) when
other uses. However, when a forensic approach is needed
inadequate shielding or inadequate mechanical design or some
because a legal action is involved, the insights in this guide
other comparable factor is identified singly or in combination
may effectively supplement it.
as the direct cause.
8.2 Documentation—Urgent post-incident efforts include:
8.4.3 The study is complete when the direct cause has been
photographing or videotaping the site and any damaged equip-
determined. Preventing the repetition of an event is the
ment; obtaining system drawi
...
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